THE COLONEL ROBERT D. HEINL, JR. 1982 MEMORIAL AWARD IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Texts of the Winning Article and Those Receiving Honorable Mentions



History and Museums Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.

The drawing by Richard A. Hillman on the cover is derived from a portrait photograph of the late Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret), for whom the annual award is named. A prolific writer and historian, Colonel Heinl served in the Marine Corps from 1937 to 1963, participating in both World War II and the Korean War.

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1982

Preface

This pamphlet reprints with the permission of the original publishers the article which won the 1982 Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. Memorial Award in Marine Corps History and those which gained honorable mentions in the competition.

The co-winners of the 1982 award, Mr. Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, each received a bronzed plaque and a check for $250. Honorable mention certificates were awarded Colonel John J. Grace, USMC (Ret), Col James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret), Mr. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., and Dr. Frank J. Olynyk.

The awards jury consisted of Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret), Mr. J. Robert Moskin, and Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR. All are charter members of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. General Henderson, since retirement after a distinguished Marine Corps career, has pursued an equally distinguished career as a military analyst. Mr. Moskin, former foreign editor of *Look* magazine and presently senior editor with Aspen Institute, is the author of the highly regarded *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* as well as other books. Colonel Millett is a professor of history at Ohio State University and, in addition to numerous academic publications, is the author of the acclaimed history of the Marine Corps, *Semper Fidelis*.

This award is an annual one given for the best article pertinent to Marine Corps history published in a given year. The award commemorates Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., the distinguished Marine Corps officer, journalist, and historian who died in May 1979. Probably the best known of his many published works is his history of the Marine Corps, *Soldiers of the Sea*. He was a founder of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, the presenter of the award.

The winner of the 1981 award, which was the first, was Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. "Skip" Bartlett, USMC, for his article, "Ouster of a Commandant," in the November 1980 issue of the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*.

Four honorable mentions also were named:

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Krulak, USMCR, for his "The U.S. Marine Corps; Strategy for the Future," *Naval Review 1980*.

Dr. Alfred J. Marini, for "Political Perceptions of the Marine Forces: Great Britain, 1699, 1739, and the United States, 1798, 1804," *Military Affairs*, December 1980.

First Lieutenant Joseph R. Owens, USMC (Ret), for "Chosin Reservoir Remembered," *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1980.

Dr. Eugene B. Sledge, for "Peleliu: A Neglected Battle," *Marine Corps Gazette* (three parts), November 1979, December 1979, January 1980.

The Heinl Award was made possible by gifts to the Marine Corps Historical Foundation for that purpose. Continuation of the award program is dependent upon further donations to the fund. Persons desiring to contribute should write to the Heinl Memorial Award Fund, Marine Corps Historical Foundation, Building 58, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374.

E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

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1982 HEINL AWARD WINNER

"Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps' Sea-Going Mission"

Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas

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Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps' Sea-Going Mission

1982 Heinl Award Winner

by Jack Shulimson and Graham A. Cosmas

Seagoing Marines owed their salvation at least as much to the cross-purposes of their enemies as to the efforts of their friends.



USS Virginia, *June 1908.*

Courtesy Naval Institute *Proceedings*.

Marines aboard USS Brooklyn *at turn of century.*

President Theodore Roosevelt's attempt in November 1908 to remove Marine guards from the warships of the U.S. Navy resulted in a noisy congressional and public controversy. This episode is often depicted as a simple melodrama in which Marines heroically and effectively rose to save their Corps from a cabal of naval officers bent on its destruction. In fact, the issues were more complex and were related to the effort to redefine Marine Corps roles and missions in the 20th century steam-and-steel Navy. In the larger context, the controversy illustrates both the complex bureaucratic infighting that shaped so much of Progressive Era reform and the growing estrangement between the lame-duck Roosevelt and the Old Guard Republican congressional leadership.

In November 1908, the Marine Corps consisted of 267 officers and 9,100 enlisted men. Approximately one-third of this force was stationed afloat, mostly as guard detachments on warships. Another third was on shore duty outside the continental United States with the largest contingent in the Philippines. The remaining third served within the United States as navy yard guards and constituted a reserve from which expeditionary forces could be organized. Since the Spanish-American War, Marine Corps strength had expanded threefold. In the latest increase, in 1908, Congress had added almost 800 officers and men and had advanced the Commandant of the Corps to the rank of major general.

While operating under the Navy Department, the Marine Corps enjoyed the legal status of a separate Service. Its staff in Washington, headed by the Commandant, was closely allied with the powerful Navy Department bureaus and had a reputation for skillful and effective congressional lobbying. Despite this reputation, Headquarters Marine Corps, in the words of one Marine officer, was "not altogether a happy family." Major General Commandant George F. Elliott, known for his blunt and often hasty speech, was partially deaf and rumored to be overly fond of the bottle. His staff was riddled with intrigue as am-

bitious, politically-connected officers pursued their own bureaucratic aggrandizement. Field Marines often regarded the Washington staff with suspicion. LtCol John A. Lejeune denounced "the politicians stationed at Headquarters" and declared, "Fortunately the real Marine Corps is elsewhere and consists of the 10,000 officers and men who are scattered around the world."

Within the Navy, sharp divisions had emerged between the so-called progressive reformers and the largely conservative bureau chiefs. The reformers, mostly young commanders and captains, favored establishing a Navy general staff, modeled on that recently created for the Army. President Roosevelt generally sympathized with the reformers and had as his personal naval aide one of the most aggressive of them, Cdr William S. Sims, yet the reformers usually met frustration at the hands of the bureau chiefs who enjoyed strong congressional support. The reformers generally viewed the Marine Corps, or at least its Washington headquarters, which usually sided with the bureau chiefs, as an obstacle to their plans. One of the more vociferous Navy progressives, Cdr William F. Fullam, claimed that "the Marines and the bureau system are twins. Both must go before our Navy . . . can be properly prepared for war."

Since the early 1890s, Fullam had been in the forefront of a movement among naval officers to take Marine guard detachments off the Navy's fighting ships. Fullam and his cohorts especially objected to the use of Marines as ships' policemen, on the grounds that it was an anachronistic holdover from the days of the press gang and was detrimental to the training, discipline, and status of the modern bluejacket.

The Fullamites envisioned a new mission for the Marine Corps within the Navy, once the Corps was freed from its obsolete tasks and was properly organized. The reformers urged that the Marines be formed into permanent battalions and given their own transports, so that they could accompany the fleet either as an expeditionary force or to seize and fortify advance bases. While many Marine officers eagerly embraced the advance base mission, all Marines insisted that the ships' guards be retained. They claimed that service on board warships kept Marines in close day-to-day association with the Navy and provided them with many of the skills needed for expeditionary and advance base duty. By 1908, Fullam's position had gained many adherents among Navy line officers, but Headquarters Marine Corps, with its allies in Congress and the bureaus had defeated repeated efforts to remove the detachments from capital ships.

Roosevelt sympathized with reformers.

By mid-1908, naval reform was in the air. The reformers proposed to a sympathetic President Roosevelt the formation of an independent civilian-military commission to study Navy Department reorganization, specifically the breakup of the bureau system. As key instigators of the commission proposal, Fullam, in command of the Navy training station at Newport, and Cdr Sims tried to use Sims' influence with the President to have the Marines removed from ships. Fullam saw success on the Marine question as "an entering wedge" to break the power of the bureaus. "No legislation and no Congressional action are needed," he told Sims, "but it prepares the way for the new gospel—that the men and officers who go to sea and make the ship, the Navy, efficient must control."

On 16 September, Sims, in a long memorandum to the President, outlined the case against the Marines. He reviewed the 20-year history of the issue, emphasizing Fullam's arguments that the use of Marines as ships' policemen undermined the discipline and morale of the bluejackets. Sims cited the fact that the Bureau of Navigation had twice recommended the removal of the Marines, but that "General Elliott goes to the Secretary and successfully combats the proposition." Sims urged Roosevelt to cut through this political tangle by using his executive authority to order the Marines off the ships. He stated: "The effect of removing the Marines from the ships would be electrical, because the demand is universal."

MajGen Cmdt Elliott was not informed.

Besides Sims, Fullam used a number of other formal and informal channels to reach the President and Secretary of the Navy. On 31 August, W.D. Walker, editor of *Army and Navy Life* and a close associate of the naval reformers, urged Roosevelt to remove the Marine guards, employing essentially the same arguments as Fullam and Sims. More important, a close Fullam associate, Cdr William R. Shoemaker, in the Bureau of Navigation, convinced the bureau chief, RAdm John E. Pillsbury, to revive the Bureau's earlier removal recommendation. On 16 October, Pillsbury wrote to Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf that "the time has arrived when all marine detachments should be removed from . . . naval vessels." Secretary Metcalf brought up the proposal at a Cabinet meeting, and President Roosevelt approved it. On 23 October, Metcalf formally concurred in Pillsbury's recommendation and directed that it be carried out.

Up to this point, all those involved in making the decision had carefully avoided consulting or informing Gen Elliott. Elliott, however, had received hints that the Marines' shipboard position again was under attack. Earlier in October, Adm Pillsbury had issued an order reducing the size of the Marine guard on one of the battleships. Although Elliott had persuaded Metcalf to rescind this order, he realized that the struggle was far from over. On 30 October, he discussed the issue with Sims and stated that he planned to ask Roosevelt directly to "have the pressure stopped." Before Elliott could meet with the President, however, Secretary Metcalf informed the Commandant that the Marines were to come off the ships. Elliott at once counterattacked. After an unsatisfactory meeting with Adm Pillsbury, Elliott, on 7 November, made a final appeal to Metcalf. He presented the Secretary a long memorandum, prepared by his staff, which declared that:

> the proposed removal of Marines from vessels of the Navy is . . . contrary to the long established and uninterrupted custom of the service, contrary to all precedents and rulings . . . contrary to the wishes of Congress, and is based upon no argument which is cogent or potent.

Metcalf rejected the Marine plea and informed the Commandant that the President already had decided on removal. Elliott then requested permission to take his case directly to Roosevelt.

On 9 November, in his meeting with the President, Elliott found Roosevelt sympathetic to the Marines but firmly committed to their removal. In the course of the conversation, Elliott emphasized that many Marine officers viewed abolition of the ships' guards as the "death knell" of the Corps. Roosevelt asked whether Elliott shared this opinion. Candidly, the Commandant replied that he did not. Roosevelt then instructed the general to draw up a statement of the Marine Corps mission once the guards were removed from the ships.

Elliott entrusted the preparation of the proposed order to three officers of his personal staff: LtCol James Mahoney, LtCol Eli K. Cole, and Maj Charles G. Long. All three were Naval Academy graduates who had been closely associated with the emerging advance base mission. Their draft order avoided mention of the ships' guards and provided that Marines were to garrison navy yards and naval stations within and beyond the continental limits of the United States. Marines were to "furnish the first line of . . . mobile defense" for overseas naval stations, and they were to help man the fortifications of such bases. The Corps was to garrison the Panama Canal Zone and furnish other such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as necessary. In an enclosure to the memorandum, the three officers recommended organization of the Marine Corps, once the ships' guards were withdrawn, into 9 permanent 1,100-man regiments. Elliott and his staff obviously were making a virtue out of necessity by trying to stake a firm claim to the advance base and expeditionary role, as well as making an expandable expeditionary organization, while conceding the loss of the ships' detachments.

On 12 November, President Roosevelt incorporated the exact wording of Elliott's memorandum in his executive order. The order did

not mention ships' guards or call for their removal, although all those concerned understood that to be its intent. During the next several months, the Bureau of Navigation gradually began the removal of the ships' detachments. By early 1909 about 800 of the 2,700 ships' guards had come off.

The immediate reaction to the executive order was predictable. Naval officers generally approved. Upon hearing the news of Roosevelt's decision, Fullam exclaimed: "Hurrah for the President! God Bless him!" and compared the executive order to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation.

Marine officers looked upon the executive order with misgivings at best, and most saw it as a first step toward the elimination of their Corps. One Marine officer stated: "The President's order . . . in effect reduces the Marine Corps to the status of watchmen." Rumors circulated in Washington that Marine officers were organizing to lobby Congress for reversal of Roosevelt's decision. Despite the unhappiness among his officers, Gen Elliott loyally supported the executive order in public, claiming that it would be "the making of the Marine Corps." On 16 November, in response to the reported Marine lobbying efforts, Elliott issued a special order forbidding such activity as "contrary to the motto of the Corps—for 'Semper Fidelis' would be but a meaningless term if it shone only on the sunny side of life or duty."

MajGen Leonard Wood, USA, wanted Marines in the Army.

Even as Elliott publicly looked toward a new role for the Marine Corps within the Navy, MajGen Leonard Wood, a confidant of Roosevelt and a leading Army progressive, saw the removal of Marines from ships as an opportunity to incorporate the Corps into the Army. Wood and most other senior Army officers were looking for a way to expand the Army's infantry. The Marine Corps had a prominent place in Army proposals for achieving this objective. During 1907, the Army Chief of Staff, LtGen J. Franklin Bell, floated as a trial balloon a plan to transfer the Army's large coast artillery corps to the Navy (and incorporate it in the Marine Corps). This would leave room in the Army for more infantry regiments. Wood, then commanding general, Division of the Philippines, offered as a counterproposal the simple incorporation of the Marines into the Army. Wood, who had a wide circle of acquaintances within the Navy and Marine Corps, respected Marine military efficiency but had gained the impression that the Navy no longer needed the Corps. Late in 1907, he wrote in a letter intended for Roosevelt's eye that the Marine Corps:

> is an able body, but its desire for enlargement is productive of unrest. A large portion of the navy are in favor of dispensing with Marines on board ship, . . . their numbers are . . . far in excess of the actual needs of the navy. We need them in the army . . .

Neither of these plans had gone beyond the talking stage when Roosevelt's executive order reopened the entire issue of the Marines' future. Wood had just returned to the United States to take over the Department of the East. He was already regarded as the leading candidate to succeed Bell as Army Chief of Staff. At Roosevelt's invitation, Wood spent several days in mid-November as a house guest at the Executive Mansion. During this visit, Wood pressed upon Roosevelt his view that the Marines should be incorporated into the Army. He argued that Elliott, through the executive order, was aiming to establish an expanded Marine infantry under the Navy Department. Wood pointed out that the President, under his executive authority, could order the Marines to duty with the Army, as had been done temporarily several times in the past. Having established such a fait accompli, Roosevelt at a later time could work out with Congress and the Service Departments the legal details of the transfer. Roosevelt was receptive to Wood's proposal. Already irritated with Marine lobbying, he told his military aide, Capt Archie Butt, that the Marines "should be absorbed into the Army, and no vestige of their organization should be allowed to remain."

While in Washington, Wood informally discussed his ideas with Gen Bell and other high-ranking Army officers. He also made an ill-fated overture to two key Marine Corps staff officers, Col Frank L. Denny and LtCol Charles L. McCawley. Both officers were well known in Washington social circles, and both had strong political connections. Denny, the

son of a prominent Indiana Republican, had many Army acquaintances and nursed ambitions to become Commandant of the Marine Corps. McCawley was the son of a former Commandant and had been the military social aide to Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt. In a chance encounter with the two men on the street in front of the White House, Wood told them that he personally favored transfer of the Marine Corps to the Army and confided that the President was inclined to such a course of action. He asked Denny and McCawley to sound out Marine officer sentiment.

On 23 November, Denny and McCawley told the Commandant, who had just returned to Washington, about the proposed merger with the Army and the President's tentative support for the idea. Much to their surprise, Gen Elliott angrily denounced such a move. In a letter of protest to Gen Wood, Elliott claimed that neither he nor the Secretary of the Navy had been told of this proposal and declared: "I would as soon believe there was a lost chord in Heaven" as to believe the President, after redefining the Corps' mission, would contemplate separating the Marines from the Navy. Replying to Elliott, Wood reiterated his own support for Army-Marine amalgamation but denied that he spoke for the President.

In a further exchange of letters, Elliott declared that Wood, as an Army general, had no right to discuss disposition of the Marine Corps, which was a separate Service. The Commandant insisted that "the entire Army and Marine Corps, with the exception of the general officers, would be bitterly opposed to such amalgamation." Wood apologized to Roosevelt for bringing his name into the discussion and forwarded all his correspondence on the subject. On 28 November, Roosevelt, in a letter addressed "Dear Leonard," committed himself on the amalgamation issue. He wrote, "You are quite welcome to quote me on that matter. I think the Marines should be incorporated with the Army." Wood on 2 December flatly informed Elliott that the President supported the transfer. The entire incident convinced Elliott, who up to now had publicly defended removal of the Marine guards, that he and the Marine Corps were being double-crossed. As he later stated, "While we had been following quietly our duties, elimination and absorption were casting unknown to us their shadows at our heels."

Elliott was among the last to learn about Wood's scheme. Almost as soon as Wood had arrived in Washington, the future of the Marine Corps had become a matter of public and private speculation. Fairly accurate accounts of Wood's proposals and Roosevelt's reaction appeared in newspapers and journals. While few Marines expressed any enthusiasm about going into the Army, many thought such a course of action inevitable as a result of the removal of ships' guards. In an extreme expression of this point of view, one officer declared: "It is imperative that we immediately sever every possible connection with the Navy by transfer to some branch of the Army . . ."

The regular House Naval Affairs Committee hearings on the annual Navy Department appropriation provided the scene for the first political skirmish over both removal of the Marine detachments and the merger of the Marines with the Army. On 9 December, in his testimony, Adm Pillsbury flatly stated the Navy Department position: "I think that it will be a very great mistake to put them [the Marines] in the Army. We want them in the Navy. We do not want them on board ship." Although the Marine officers, including Gen Elliott, made no mention of the subject in their public testimony, Elliott informed the committee off the record that he now opposed removal of the ships' detachments. In perhaps the shrewdest maneuver of the hearing, LtCol George E. Richards, assistant paymaster of the Corps, responding to a prearranged question from a committee member, presented a memorandum estimating that it would cost the Navy Department an additional $425,000 to replace Marines with sailors on board ships. At the end of the session, the committee voted to hold supplementary hearings by a subcommittee on the entire Marine issue.

In the period between the conclusion of the full House committee hearings in December and the opening of the subcommittee hearings in January, the Marine Corps and its allies mobilized for the struggle. Marine staff officers prepared several detailed memoranda supporting their position. On 20 December, a group of Marine officers from several east coast navy yards met privately at Boston to discuss "the new status of the Marine Corps." While they publicly denied that their meeting had anything to do with attempts to reverse the President's executive order, few observers believed they met for any other purpose. Sims and Fullam exchanged rumors and warnings about the Marines' organizing and lobbying efforts. The Army question, meanwhile, faded into the background. Although Wood continued to discuss the subject privately, neither

he nor Roosevelt took any overt action. They and the War Department were apparently unwilling to challenge directly Navy control of the Marines if the Navy wanted to retain the Corps.

When the subcommittee began its hearings on 9 January 1909, it was obvious that pro-Marine forces were in control. Representative Thomas H. Butler, who presided over most of the sessions, had a son in the Marine Corps and was on the record as opposing Roosevelt's executive order. The clerk of the subcommittee was a former Marine officer. Gen Elliott and his staff attended almost the entire hearing, and the subcommittee permitted them to cross-examine witnesses. Cdr Fullam described the atmosphere of the proceedings: "The Marine colonels were ever present. A stranger could not have distinguished them from members of the Committee. They rose at will to exhort, object, and cross-examine." Although one-sided, Fullam's observations were in the main correct. He and the other reformers faced a rigged jury and a hanging judge.

Before the hearings ended on 15 January, a parade of 34 witnesses testified. All of the Marines opposed withdrawal of the guard detachments from ships, while the Navy officers split evenly for and against. Both sides reiterated their traditional arguments for and against keeping Marines on warships. Using rudimentary cost-effectiveness analysis, they presented conflicting estimates of the expense involved in replacing Marines with sailors.

While the subcommittee focused on the cost issue, the question of transferring the Marine Corps to the Army was never far from the surface. Several Marine and Navy opponents of the executive order warned that removal of the guard detachments might lead to the Navy losing the Marine Corps, while supporters of the order affirmed their desire to keep the Marines in the Navy. Fullam, for example, declared: "If I were king here tomorrow, I would preserve the Marine Corps . . . as a splendidly organized mobile force, to serve with the Navy . . ." Secretary Newberry testified that if it were a choice between losing the Marines and putting them back on ship, "I would rather put them back aboard ship." The prospect of absorption of the Marines by the Army was also a stumbling block to congressional supporters of Roosevelt. Representative John W. Weeks, wrote to Fullam: "My mind now inclines to leave in the hands of the Executive the question of where the Marines shall serve, but takes a positive stand against action which will tend to amalgamate the Corps with the Army.

When the full Naval Affairs Committee reported the naval appropriation bill to the House on 16 January, it was clear that the Marine point of view had prevailed. The committee recommended insertion in the bill of a provision that:

> hereafter officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps shall serve . . . on board all battleships and armored cruisers, . . . in detachments of not less than eight per centum of the strength of the enlisted men of the Navy on said vessels.

When the appropriation bill came up for consideration before the House, administration forces, assisted by vigorous Navy Department and White House lobbying, turned the tables on the Marines. On 21 January the House passed the bill without the proposed amendment to keep Marines on board ships.

The fight now shifted to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, where the Marine Corps could depend on the support of the powerful chairman, Senator Eugene Hale of Maine. Hale, a staunch Roosevelt opponent, was at loggerheads with the President over Navy Department reorganization in general and specifically had come out against taking the



Marines off ships. Without bothering to hold hearings on the question of Marine removal, Hale's committee on 10 February reported the appropriation bill to the Senate with numerous amendments, including reinsertion of the House committee's original provision overturning Roosevelt's executive order.

On the Senate floor, the administration made a major effort to defeat the amendment. Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a

personal friend of Roosevelt and long-time supporter of a big Navy, led the fight, liberally supplied with argument and documents by Sims and Fullam. During the Senate debate on 16 and 17 February, Lodge restated the reformers' arguments about the need to restructure the Marine Corps, but significantly disavowed any intention to put the Marines into the Army and stated that he himself would oppose any such effort. Senator Hale, on the other hand, kept hammering at the point that Congress had equal authority with the President over the Navy Department and warned that "the underlying purpose [of removal] is to take these people away from the navy and in the end turn them over to the army." When the amendment came up for final approval on the 17th, it passed by a vote of 51 to 12. This result reflected more personal and political hostility to Roosevelt than conviction about the status of the Marine Corps. Among the supporters of the amendment were most of the Democrats and a strong contingent of conservative Republicans. All of the opponents of the amendment were either Roosevelt loyalists, such as Lodge, or Republican progressives, including William E. Borah and Robert M. LaFollette.



After Senate passage of the entire bill on the 17th, the legislation went to a conference committee headed by Senator Hale and Representative George E. Foss, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. As part of the complex bargaining over dozens of amendments, the House initially refused to accept the Senate provision on the Marines. Roosevelt, however, now was willing to surrender on the Marine issue in order to obtain favorable consideration on the other naval issues. On 18 February, he wrote to Representative Foss: "The bill as it passed the Senate will, as regards this point, do a little damage [but] it does not do very much." Roosevelt made no mention of putting the Marines in the Army and declared that he had issued his executive order "with the explicit object of retaining the marines for the purpose of an expeditionary force . . ." With this signal from the President, the House conferees gave way on the Marine issue. On 1 March, both houses passed the naval appropriation bill with the amendment requiring return of the Marine guards to the ships of the fleet.

During the remaining days of his administration, Roosevelt and Secretary Newberry attempted to find loopholes in the language of the appropriation act which would permit the President to keep the Marines off the ships. Newberry declared: "I have issued no orders about the return of Marines to the ships and will not do so."

The new President, William Howard Taft, was not about to challenge Congress and immediately took steps to reverse Roosevelt's final measures. As early as 25 January, the President-elect had taken a conciliatory tone, writing to Senator Hale:

> I intend, so far as possible, to do nothing without full consultation with you managers of the Senate, and while of course it is not expected that we may always agree, it may be asserted that we shall never surprise each other.

On 5 April, Taft's Attorney General, at the Navy Department's request, declared that in his opinion the Congressional requirement that Marines make up eight percent of a ship's crew was constitutional. Very soon thereafter, Marines began marching up the gangplanks of Navy warships, and the controversy was over.

The participants reacted predictably to the outcome. For the Army, it was a case of very little ventured and nothing gained, since Wood's negotiations had been entirely confidential and informal, although quite serious in intent. Some Army officers, nevertheless, believed that "a great opportunity has been lost by the restoration of the Marines to the ships." Navy reformers such as Fullam railed against the decision, denouncing the "parlor and club colonels" of the Marine Corps and grumbling that the entire Navy was "at the mercy of the shore-staying staff and their political friends." More moderate reformers,

RAdm Luce issued a warning.

Courtesy Naval Institute *Proceedings*.

for example the respected RAdm Stephen B. Luce, founder of the Navy War College, warned that withdrawal of the ships' guards would have led to the "obliteration" of the Marine Corps. Taking Luce's lead, the Navy's General Board in later years would refuse to support the Fullamites in their agitation for removal of the Marine guards on the grounds that such action would lead to the loss of the Corps to the Army. Marines breathed a sigh of relief over what they considered their narrow escape and would cling ever more tenaciously to what was in effect a relatively minor mission. They viewed Fullam and his henchmen with suspicion and often outright hostility and believed they were continually vulnerable to power grabs by ambitious Army and Navy officers. On the occasion of renewed agitation by Fullam in 1913, Maj Smedley D. Butler exploded in a letter to his Quaker father, Representative Thomas Butler, who had chaired the special subcommittee in 1909: "I wish somebody would beat the S.O.B. to death. Please try to help us, Father," he pleaded, "for the Lord only knows what will become of our little Corps."

An agitated Maj Butler wrote to his father.

Despite Butler's alone-against-the-world outlook, the Marines in 1908-1909 owed their success against Roosevelt's executive order only partially to their own political action. The Marine Corps approached the removal issue with divided councils. Gen Elliott, obviously influenced by the advance base-oriented members of his informal staff, initially tried to trade acquiescence in the removal of the detachments for a reinforced and expanded Corps designed around the advance base and expeditionary missions. There was much justice in the accusation, made by both Adm Luce and Gen Wood, that the Major General Commandant was trying to take advantage of Roosevelt's order to establish an army of his own. Probably a majority of Marine officers in the field, as well as key members of the Headquarters staff, adamantly opposed removal of the guards from the beginning. Still other Marines, typified by Denny and McCawley, simply sought to turn the situation to their own personal advantage and flirted, more or less seriously, with amalgamation into the Army. Whether Elliott was simply swayed by the conflicting currents within the Corps or acting from firm conviction is not entirely clear from the evidence. What is certain is that he swung into active opposition to removal of the Marine guards only after becoming convinced that the President had betrayed him.

President Roosevelt did a great deal to frustrate his own order by, in effect, doublecrossing both the Marine Corps and the Navy reformers through his dealings with Wood. Even these factors and the Marine lobbying would not have been enough to reverse Roosevelt's order, had it not been for the general anti-Roosevelt hostility of the conservative Republican Senate leadership and the particular enmity of Senator Hale for all manifestations of naval reform. Taft's retreat from Roosevelt's policy toward the Marines foreshadowed the new President's gradual drift into alliance with the conservative faction of the Republican party. In the end, then, the ships' detachments owed their salvation at least as much to the cross-purposes of their enemies as to the efforts of their friends. Perhaps a newspaper's amateur poet had the last word:

The guard they stood at attention,
Like they didn't give a damn,
to hear the word of the Overlord,
The original great I am.
And he tells us that we ain't wanted,
That the jackies will go it alone.
But I thought I heard an under word
From a power behind the throne. USMC



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"Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission"

Colonel John J. Grace, USMC (Ret)

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Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission

by Colonel J. J. Grace, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

1982 Honorable Mention

The enemy commander knows the amphibious force is out there, far beyond the horizon. What he doesn't know is if the amphibious force commander will launch an assault. If he does launch, where will he strike? When? Those are some of the problems amphibious forces can pose for enemy commanders.

But under modern conditions, to cause those problems they will need modern ships, modern helicopters, and modern landing craft. Until these arrive in the force in sufficient numbers, amphibious commanders will have to approximate the new tactics as best they can with the old ships, the old helicopters, and the old landing craft.

Opposite, we see some of what we have, the Coronado *(LPD 11) and* Portland *(LSD 37), just after they have completed their run in from sea and launched their 8-knot LVTPs not far off the North Carolina coast, about two years ago.*

The words "amphibious assault" conjure up an image of transports anchored a few miles offshore, disembarking their troops into landing craft and amphibian vehicles. These small craft form up in a series of assault waves and head toward a beach like that at Iwo Jima. At the water's edge the troops leave the craft and hurl themselves at an entrenched enemy who pours direct fire on the assault waves from positions seemingly impervious to the invaders' supporting arms.

Is there any connection between this notion of a bloody assault against a defended beach and the picture of an XM-1 tank easing down the bow ramp of a C-5A transport aircraft? Does the idea of a fuel truck being driven off a roll-on, roll-off merchant ship moored to a pier have anything to do with the scene of a cluttered beach in Normandy on 7 June 1944? Recent events near the Persian Gulf impel us to consider such questions, for they have made us vitally concerned with the ways by which we can project U. S. combat power overseas.

In last year's *Naval Review,* Bing West explained the Carter Administration's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) as follows: ". . . this concept neither requires nor provides an assault capability on the part of our amphibious forces. Maritime prepositioning can be staged in commercial ships . . . for administrative landings at perhaps one-half the cost of building assault ships of equal lift. . . . Assault shipping is intended for the recapture of territory or the outflanking of an enemy after war has begun. Maritime prepositioning is intended to prevent the loss of the territory and to deter the aggression in the first place. If forced by budgets to choose, maritime prepositioning should be developed, even at the expense of assault shipping."[1]

In the same issue Bill Krulak argued that, rather than accepting the amphibious mission as its sole reason for existence, the Marine Corps should shift its focus to the RDF mission as a broader and more supportable basis for its institutional identity in the future.[2] Both of these essays illustrate a long-standing mind set of many civilian commentators and managers within the Department of Defense in which the forces of the marketplace are counted on to influence decisions on the efficient allocation of resources.

Amphibious warfare, which is on the margin between naval and land warfare, has almost always suffered from a lack of interest in

[1]For footnotes, please turn to page 131.



J. J. Grace

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both the Army and the Navy. And certainly the Air Force gives it little thought. One result of this neglect by the major services is that civilian policymakers who, at best, have a confused and incomplete picture of amphibious warfare, are inclined to dismiss the subject as an anachronism that survives only because it is the sole *raison d'être* of the Marine Corps, itself an organizational anomaly.

Conventional Wisdom

The Department of Defense has long assumed that the most demanding military task faced by the United States is the defense of Western Europe against an onslaught by Warsaw Pact forces. The principal role of naval forces in this scenario is the defense of shipping crossing the North Atlantic. These ships must sail safely, so the logic goes, in order for reinforcements to reach the land and air forces on the continent if a conflict lasts longer than a few weeks without escalating to a general nuclear war. The scenario is reminiscent of the European campaign in 1944-1945 except for the absence of any large-scale amphibious operations or, for that matter, major counteroffensives of any kind. But then, before Dunkirk, military planners in Europe anticipated no need for amphibious operations or, on the part of the Allies, for major offensive campaigns either.

As we know it, amphibious warfare was conceived and developed in response to the anticipated needs of our naval forces in a conflict with Japan across the Pacific. Given the location of areas of vital interest to the United States (the Philippines and the East Indies), and the capabilities of the ships and aircraft of the period, the success of a naval campaign (which in turn was a necessary precondition for any subsequent land or air campaigns) depended on the possession of advanced bases. If such bases were held by the enemy, they had to be seized. If they did not exist, they had to be built. These geographic and operational aspects of the Pacific campaign had a significant effect on the tactics and logistics of amphibious warfare.

The ports and airfields needed to support the offensive across thousands of miles of open ocean were located on various small islands. Though the islands could be isolated from enemy reinforcements by naval operations, they offered few places for getting a landing force ashore. Once ashore the landing force had even fewer opportunities for maneuver. The rough, restricted terrain inland provided good defensive positions which the enemy fortified heavily. The inevitable tactical response to these conditions was a frontal assault by Marine and Army infantry.

Not only were the ports and airfields throughout the Pacific few in number, but they were also underdeveloped for their intended use. This led to the creation within the fleet of an ability to construct expeditionary base facilities rapidly. The Seabees who did this became famous for their ability to improve airfields and clear ports while the fighting still raged ashore. And they built new facilities where before nothing had existed but palm trees and coral.

The combination of these advanced naval bases and the fleet's mobile service forces provided the sustained support the carrier and amphibious striking forces needed to maintain their momentum from one island chain to the next. It was this expeditionary logistic capability, expanded to support land and air as well as naval forces, that played such a key role across the various European and Pacific beaches, in the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and in the last battle for Okinawa.

Following the war, the Department of Defense was created, and in that department the experiences of all the armed forces were institutionalized. The new department specified the function of each of the uniformed services and delineated the relationships among them in what was to be the ideal "joint" environment. The Navy and Marine Corps were chartered to provide forces to: "seek out and destroy enemy naval forces . . . suppress [the enemy's] commerce . . . gain and maintain . . . naval supremacy . . . control vital sea areas . . . protect . . . sea lines of communications . . . seize and defend advanced naval bases, and . . . conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to . . . a naval campaign."[3] In addition, the Marine Corps was assigned "primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, and equipment

. . . of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps."[4]

The *Dictionary of Military Terms* of the Joint Chiefs of Staff defines an amphibious operation as "an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft, involving a landing on a hostile shore."[5] Joint doctrine on the subject tells us that "the salient requirement of the amphibious operation is the necessity of building up combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack drives toward the final objectives."[6] These official statements invoke images of World War II. But except for those few still in service who had firsthand experience in such operations 30 or more years ago (Inchon in 1950 was the last of this genre), officers can find these images now only in history books or old movies.

Many things have changed since Normandy and Okinawa. Because of nuclear weapons, tacticians of all kinds have had to find ways to reduce the vulnerability of military units while still retaining their capability to concentrate rapidly at a critical time and place. The solution seems to be to disperse the elements of a force while providing them with the tactical mobility they need to achieve combat power superior to the enemy's at the point of decision. Mechanized and air-mobile (helicopter) formations have much more of this capability than did the formations of World War II. In Vietnam air-mobile tactics worked well against a guerrilla foe. But new weapons raise questions about the future viability of both helicopter-borne and mechanized maneuver elements. Meantime, technology, as always, affects logistics as much as it does tactics.

With greater firepower, improved tactical mobility, and better command and control than any of their predecessors, today's ground and air forces also need much more logistic support, in the form of supplies, maintenance, and transportation, than their predecessors did. But then modern technology has improved the services' ability to provide themselves with this support. Most importantly, the ships and aircraft available to transport today's forces and the supplies they require are much bigger and faster than those of World War II. Moreover, a revolutionary commercial development, containerized cargo-handling, has greatly speeded the loading and unloading of ships and airplanes. Unfortunately, we

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

KIRBY HARRISON

One of the few advanced bases available to the United States in the Indian Ocean is Diego Garcia. Above, we see a Seabee making his own amphibious progress across the island after a torrential rainfall. At left, cargo ships wait to unload at Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port of Jidda. The number of ships waiting and the fact that nearly all have their own cargo booms help describe the harbor facilities ashore. The contribution amphibious ships can make in circumstances such as these is plain.

have not yet been able to exploit this speed-up when we operate in an expeditionary environment. Once we do get the material ashore, modern technology can aid in the rapid construction of facilities needed for personnel support and equipment maintenance. In order to realize the full potential of all these improvements, we must recognize logistic support for what it is—a necessary and integral part of any force's operational capability.

Table 1 lists the highlights of these trends in terms of both capability and share of available naval resources allocated. The ups and downs over the period reflect the changing priorities that have been assigned by strategists and programmers.

The Current Situation

Within the past year or two this country has been attempting to adjust to a new strategic situation. In the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, far from our shores or the borders of any of our traditional allies, some of the United States' vital interests are threatened. In the great distances between key locations, the need for advanced bases, and the austere condition of most of the few man-made facilities that exist in the region, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf resemble World War II's Pacifc Theater. But here, instead of being on a series of archipelagoes, all the potential tactical objectives of an amphibious force are on or near the coast of a continental landmass. Another important difference here is that inland the terrain generally is open. These facts affect both tactics and logistics.

The biggest problems arising from this situation are the strategic imponderables. Even if solutions can be found to the problems of deploying and supporting a sizable force in a hostile environment half a world away, what will be the military objectives of such a force? Will the strategy be purely defensive or will offensive operations be required to safeguard the nation's interests? Finally, these questions, and many others, must be answered under the shadow of the Soviet threat to the oil fields from the north.

Clearly, the strategic mobility planning and the means of implementation that may be appropriate in Europe are not suitable for the Persian Gulf. A strategic mobility planner looking at Europe knows that significant U. S. and allied forces will already be in place on the continent at the outbreak of hostilities. The requirement is to strengthen these forces rapidly. This can be done best by prepositioning equipment and airlifting people. Hence, we have placed large quantities of equipment and supplies in friendly base areas. The troops to use that equipment would be ferried from the United States by administrative airlift. After collecting their equipment, they would move overland to forward defensive positions.

In a Persian Gulf crisis there may be no friendly forces ashore near the scene of potential conflict. There is no assurance that the terminals where the troops can meet their equipment and supplies will be in friendly hands when they are needed. Therefore, we must be able to move to the region, establish the necessary base facilities (if necessary by seizing them), and then conduct whatever combat operations may be required. As to the likelihood that local allies will do some of our work for us, it is well to remember that if we have to resort to military operations it will be to secure access to oil, not to prop up some weak local government.

It is evident that amphibious assault equipment and tactics based on experience nearly forty years old in other parts of the world are inadequate for the situations likely to be encountered east of Suez in the 1980s.

Because we cannot anticipate where we may have to land, the Navy and Marine Corps should concentrate on developing and maintaining the most flexible capability possible to project landing forces ashore. This requires firstly mental flexibility in order to free planners from answers which were good solutions to problems we no longer have. Secondly, it requires the exploration and exploitation of new technology such as VSTOL aircraft, aircushion landing craft, precision-guided weapons, and the whole range of equipment and tactics of electronic warfare as they might affect amphibious operations. Thirdly, it requires adherence to the traditional bent of the naval service to "go in harm's way," in a thoughtful and innovative manner designed to make an opponent react to our actions rather than always having to react to his.

If we go to Europe, we will most likely be going to the aid of reliable allies (or else why go?). There the tactical capability to force our way ashore probably will be less important than the expeditionary logistic capability to land without dependence on ports or airfields and to project ashore a tactically integrated, self-contained, air-ground force. For instance, the ability to support operations in extreme cold, as in Norway, is more a logistical than a tactical problem.

Landings in the Caribbean or on the shores of the South China Sea will most likely face lower levels of opposition than we might expect in Europe. If we develop them properly, the mobility of amphibious and landing forces can be exploited in such circum-

stances to land at places and times most favorable to our side. As we have already seen in two wars over the past 30 years, helicopters (and potentially VSTOL aircraft) provide better tactical mobility ashore in such rough terrain as Korea's or the jungles of Southeast Asia, than do ground vehicles. But in open terrain such as one finds in the Middle East, in Southwest Asia, and in Central Europe, it is probable that more mechanization will be needed than the Marines have. At least, the experiences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war point in that direction.

Because resources will always be limited, it is wrong to prepare solely for the "classical" amphibious assault landing when more often what will be needed is a landing across an uncontested beach or even through a friendly harbor. Indeed, sometimes the task will be, not the landing of major combat elements, but the evacuation of civilians in danger.

The establishment of a logical frame of reference for the examination of alternatives is the most important part of any review of strategy and forces. We need such a framework if we are to get even approximately right answers to such emotionally charged questions as:

- What is the proper relationship between airlift and sealift in the projection of conventional forces overseas?
- How do the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the amphibious forces of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets complement each other in crisis management or combat operations?
- And how do we relate the tactics and logistics of amphibious operations to the requirements of the land and air campaigns which may begin with them?

A New Look

Let us start with Rear Admiral Henry Eccles's

Table 1 ***Evolution Of U. S. Navy Amphibious Forces (1940-1980)****

Date	*Active Ships*	*(% Fleet)*	*Ship Types*	*Lift (MAF Assault Echelon)*	*Resources*	*Remarks*
1940	20	—	AP, AK & APD	<1	Minimal	Ships were converted passenger liners, freighters, and destroyers
1945	1728	(.40)	APA, AKA, & LST	11	Mostly operations and maintenance dollars for active ships	Reliance on WWII residual ships activated from "mothball" fleet for Korea
1950	91	(.15)	APA, AKA, & LST	<1		
1955	242	(.21)	LSD-28 & LPH	2		
1960	113	(.14)	introduced	1.75	$1.0B	FY 1961 budget request
1965	135	(.15)	LPD & 20 Knot LST added	2.0 (program objective)	2.2B (26% of SCN)	Part of OSD's Strategic Mobility enhancement program
1969	162	(.17)		1.67 (p.o.)	$1.5B	Start of Post-Vietnam "wind-down"
1970	118	(.14)		1.33 (p.o.)	$1.4B	LHAs Cut from 9 to 5; high ship costs cited
1976	62	(.13)	First LHA added. Entire force 20 Knot	1.33 (p.o.)	$1.25B	
1979	65	(.14)		1.15 (p.o.)	$ .85B	Lowest ebb since Pre-Korea
1980	60	(.13)	Last LHA delivered. LSD-41 programmed	1.15 (p.o.)	$1.3B (8% of SCN)	Includes $200M for Maritime Prepositioning Ships (Carter Budget)

*Data in this table are from a number of sources. The pre-World War II status of amphibious forces was gleaned from Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War* (Princeton, 1951). Numbers of active ships, fleet size, lift capacity (in terms of lift for the assault echelon of a Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF), and the approximate dates of introduction of new ship types are from Lt. Cdr. Carl Douglas, USN, "Amphibious Deficiencies—The Navy's 'Ostrich Act'," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept. 1980. The figures were cross-checked with the *Naval Review* issues of 1975 and 1980. Program Objectives (p.o.) for amphibious lift and the resources allocated to achieve them are from annual SecDef reports to Congress and other DOD documents. All dollar figures are expressed in FY 1981 dollars of total obligational authority. Percentages of the Ship Construction, Navy (SCN) appropriation allocated to new amphibious ship construction are shown for two selected years to give an indication of how this percentage has varied over the past 15 years (it was 0% in some of the intervening years).

definition of strategy: "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."[7] Nowadays the overriding objective of military strategy is to deter potential enemies from taking actions harmful to one's own country and its interests. If deterrence fails, our leaders have said the United States will protect her interests, but at the lowest level and most restricted scope of violence possible. If we expect to be able both to limit the use of force and protect our interests we cannot always react defensively to an opponent's gambit. We must have an offensive capability at our disposal with which we can take the initiative in any part of the world where U. S. interests are threatened.

Consider the following hypothetical alternative to the scenario that unfolded recently. When the U. S. Embassy in Teheran was overrun in February, 1979, nine months before the hostages were seized, a combined diplomatic and military contingency plan could have been developed. Because Teheran is 345 nautical miles from the head of the Persian Gulf, an emergency evacuation like those conducted in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 would not have been feasible with the helicopters we have. So, let us imagine that arrangements were made to relocate the Embassy staff to the U. S. consulate in Khorramshahr and that in the meantime an amphibious task group (ATG) was sailed to reinforce the Navy's small Middle East Force.

All vital U. S. interests in Iran would have been consolidated in the southwestern corner of the country. Diplomatic relations could have been maintained with Iran as long as this was in our best interest but our people would have been only 55 nautical miles from protection. While the ATG would be close to the scene, the CV battle groups could be outside the Strait of Hormuz. This is more than 500 nautical miles away from Khorramshahr, no small distance, but under conceivable circumstances it would still have been possible to provide some air cover, if that



The Arabian Peninsula and its surroundings. This is a huge area of land and sea. Even so, very few of the potential advanced bases currently under discussion for use by American forces are even on the map. Mombasa, for example, is about 900 miles to the southwest of Berbera, while to fly from Berbera to Diego Garcia is to go about 1,900 miles to the southeast. From Berbera to an objective area at, say, Bandar Abbas at the Strait of Hormuz, is 1,520 miles by sea. Those are long distances to have to go back for food, fuel, ammunition, supplies, and fresh water.


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AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Tigris River
Euphrates River
Khorramshahr
Basra
Abadan
Shatt-al-Arab
KUWAIT
Al-Kuwait
Bushehr
PERSIAN GULF
Bandar Abbas
Qeshm
Strait of Hormuz
Qoins
OMAN
Chah Bahar
Gwadar
Dhahran
BAHREIN
SAUDI
Dubai
GULF OF OMAN
Riyadh
Abu Dhabi
Muscat
U. A. E.
BOUNDARY UNDEFINED
ARABIA
Masirah
OMAN
Kuria
Muria Is.
Salalah
BOUNDARY UNDEFINED
SOUTH YEMEN
(P.D.R.Y.)
NORTH YEMEN
(Y.A.R.)
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Aden
Bab el-Mandeb
Perim
Socotra
T. OF A. & I.
GULF OF ADEN
Djibouti
SOMALIA
Berbera
45°
50°
55°
60

PH3 GEORGE BRUDER, USN

The USNS Mercury *(T-AKR 11), one of three Ro/Ro ships now prepositioned at Diego Garcia, is shown loading military equipment at Wilmington, North Carolina, this past summer. Provided there is enough deep water alongside, she can unload herself, which is more than most American Ro/Ro ships can do. The 19,172-ton* Mercury *is credited with a sustained speed of 23 knots and a radius of 10,000 miles at that speed.*

were needed. In any event, this combination of amphibious force and carrier battle group would have been more responsive to the need than transport aircraft flying from sensitive foreign bases over a thousand miles away.

The critical command and control link between Washington and officials on the scene would have been provided by secure communications facilities at the consulate or aboard the flagship of Commander Middle East Force offshore. When it became obvious that the new governmemt of Iran was unable or unwilling to protect American citizens the evacuation plan would have been implemented.

Such "Monday morning quarterbacking" is intended only as an illustration of how a combination of initiative with a good set of operational capabilities can be useful in a crisis.

One needn't confine his thoughts on this subject to small-unit deployments. As a crisis develops and the authorities in Washington deliberate, consult, and negotiate, as much amphibious shipping as necessary can be sailed to build up combat power offshore without automatically committing the United States to a conflict. That this can be done was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when a full Marine division-wing team was embarked at ports on the east and west coasts, sailed to the waters off Cuba, maintained there for a month, and without ever being committed ashore, returned to its various ports of embarkation.

If Washington decides to land the landing force, the time and place of landing can be chosen to exploit weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions and avoid his strong points. There are over 1,000 miles of continental coastline around the Persian Gulf alone, and most of them are usable by modern landing craft (helicopters and air cushion vehicles). But to realize the full potential of the mobility of an amphibious task force, the embarked landing force must have adequate tactical mobility once ashore and the whole force must have enough logistic support so that for a fairly long period it can be independent of established ports and airfields. (Keep in mind that the port of Cherbourg was not available to support the Allied landing forces until almost three months after D-Day in Normandy; until then the invading armies were supplied over the beach.) More will be said of these interrelated capabilities later.

Finally, amphibious forces of the fleet complement the much-publicized RDF in ways that can make the latter a force of real utility. If necessary, the airfields and ports needed to unload MAC transports and maritime prepositioning ships can be seized by amphibious operations. The landing force put ashore can secure the marshaling areas, which must be large enough for the tens of thousands of air-transported

troops to find and make ready their heavy equipment and supplies, and to reorganize themselves into tactical formations. And the amphibious force's ships, craft, and helicopters can help in the subsequent local transportation of units from wherever they join their equipment to wherever they are needed tactically. It is evident that the sea, air, and land forces of a balanced fleet with its own integrated command and control system meet the necessary—and may satisfy the sufficient—conditions needed to control a particular crisis. There is a good chance no additional force need be applied. If more force is needed, elements of the RDF deploying safely into the permissive environment created by landing forces already on the scene can reinforce the latter.

As much sense as this view of amphibious operations makes, and after nearly forty years of repeated demonstrations of their utility, amphibious forces still have difficulty getting 10 to 15 percent of the resources allocated to similar forces by the Defense Department.[8] Only an institutional change can improve this situation. The solution can be found in the arrangements enjoyed by airlift within DOD, which have yielded great success in the continuing competition for resources. The commander of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) should be elevated to the status of a Specified Commander, coequal with Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CinCMAC). With the rank and staff appropriate to his new status he would also be given the responsibility for planning and controlling the employment of all of our national sealift assets—not only the U. S. naval ships currently operated by MSC, and chartered U. S.-flag merchantmen, but also all amphibious shipping. That officer would become the focal point of matters relating to the support and continued development of this national capability. What is good for one of our two means of projecting forces overseas should be good for the other.

The Commander in Chief Military Sealift Command (CinCMSC) would still report to the CNO and SecNav, just as his counterpart, CinCMAC, answers to his service chief and department head. Active amphibious ships would continue to be assigned to the operational control of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Existing relations between the Navy and Marine Corps within the Navy Department would not change. What would change would be the visibility of, and therefore the attention given to, this critical element of our strategic mobility. Effective, efficient solutions to a wide range of sealift problems could be pursued in a coordinated way without doing excessive violence to the amphibious warfare doctrine developed in World War II. (To bring it up to date the old doctrine needs to suffer some violence. As long as we develop new ways and means of carrying out likely future amphibious missions, the violence will not be "excessive.") But most important, decision-makers at the highest levels of government would have the benefit of a comprehensive and balanced exposition of the ways and means of projecting U. S. power overseas in support of national strategic objectives.

PH1 A. J. RINGUETTE, USN

Results of New Look

Let us examine the ability of our amphibious forces to maintain a military presence where we have no troops ashore. Before the Vietnam War there were four amphibious task units deployed forward

A common sight of our times: the rescue of civilian refugees from an unsafe place by an amphibious ship. In this case the place was Beirut, Lebanon, the time was June 1976, and the rescue ship awaiting the refugees crowded aboard an LCU was the old Spiegel Grove *(LSD 32). By boat, people can be rescued from seaports or beaches. By helo they can be reached nearly 100 miles inland. A future VSTOL transport could reach nearly 500 miles inland, which might have made possible a rescue at Teheran.*

continuously—one in the Mediterranean, two in the Western Pacific, and one in the Caribbean. Because of our declining amphibious strength, the Caribbean deployment long ago became an "occasional" rather than a continuously maintained station. The current Arabian Sea deployment is carried out on a port-and-starboard basis, alternating the Mediterranean amphibious task unit with the one ATU in the Western Pacific that has the ability to conduct a vertical envelopment.

Considering both the uncertain future and our many years of successful crisis management (such as the landing in Lebanon in 1958, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the recapture of the *Mayaguez* in 1975), it appears as if four forward-deployed amphibious task units is a prudent compromise between assuming the role of world policeman and abandoning the government's responsibility to protect its citizens overseas. The most likely missions of these units are to show the flag, to assist in the management of crises, and to evacuate U. S. nationals in emergencies. Their task organization should reflect the operational requirements of these missions. The ships should be reasonably habitable and should have good sea-keeping characteristics, for they will make long deployments. They should have secure communication links with headquarters around the world and adequate flag spaces so an embarked staff can work efficiently. And since the embarked landing force will depend primarily on helicopters or VSTOL aircraft for ship-to-shore movement in their most likely missions, these ships should be able to operate and support significant numbers of these types of aircraft.

To exploit the tactical mobility of the helicopter, the landing force units would necessarily be "light," just as they are now with, for mobility on the ground, a small number of helicopter-transportable vehicles and, for fire support ashore, a few artillery pieces. If they are properly trained and equipped, such light, helicopter-borne infantry units are most useful for limited-objective offensive and defensive missions such as the counter-terrorist raids at Entebbe or Mogadiscio and the protection of embassies. In larger operations, such units are useful for deep reconnaissance and security missions. Currently, assuming the presence of the large CH-53D helicopter, which has a radius of 97 nautical miles, the umbrella of protection offered by sea-based air-mobile units can be provided to about three quarters of the Americans living and working abroad. When the operating forces get aircraft like the VSTOL-A prototype, which has twice the speed of a CH-53D and a radius of 475 nautical miles, the umbrella can be extended to over 90 percent of the locations where American citizens can be found overseas.[9]

The combined mission needs of the amphibious task unit and its embarked Marine amphibious unit could be satisfied by a deployment unit, or DU, of two ships of modern design like the LHA and the LSD-41. Four such DUs of two ships each would add up to eight ships forward deployed at all times. This would provide better worldwide presence and respon-

TEXTRON

PHT JOHN SHEPPARD, USN

Two kinds of landing craft enter the well decks of LSDs. Above, the Jeff-B air cushion vehicle, or LCAC, enters the Spiegel Grove *while, at right, an LCU enters the* Pensacola. *Even when LCACs become common, it will be useful to employ conventional landing craft because of their great economy and carrying capacity. The LCU and LCAC take up about the same space inside the ship but, while the LCU has only about a quarter of the air cushion vehicle's speed, she can carry about three times the load.*



PHC KEN GEORGE, USN

The ideal deployment unit will consist of an LSD combined with one of the big new LHAs, such as the Tarawa *(LHA 1), pictured here off Mindoro in the Philippines this past November. Notice the CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters on the flight deck, along with four Harrier AV-8A attack planes (one of them airborne). The ship's stern gate is open, permitting landing craft of all kinds and varieties to enter and leave. The tactical potential of such a deployment unit is great.*

siveness to crises than our current forward deployments of 14 to 16 ships out of a total force of about 65 amphibious ships (some of which are partly manned by naval reservists), and could be main)ained by an amphibious force of 32 ships, or approximately one-half the size of our present force.

When the need arises to reinforce U. S. presence near the scene of a crisis, the surge capability of the amphibious force becomes important. The much smaller active force described above still has a significant surge capability provided it is composed of ships of modern design. Assuming that 15 percent of the force would be unavailable as a result of extended overhauls in progress, at least 20 ships would be immediately available to respond without drawing down on forward deployments outside the area of crisis. A force of this size could be assembled near a trouble spot in Southwest Asia within a few weeks and it could have embarked the combat power of a Marine amphibious brigade, or MAB. The brigade could consist of as many as 20,000 troops (a large number of whom would be aviation support specialists) and over 300 aircraft. The aircraft complement could include both helicopters and tactical aircraft like the advanced Harrier, task organized for the mission at hand.

But even such a formidable force offshore could not be expected to "go it alone" if major combat operations were anticipated. First of all, any large scale activities would most likely be joint-service affairs and the forces involved would have to be assured of adequate operating and support bases. Facilities at Diego Garcia would be used to the utmost but they are not all that large and they are over 2,000 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz. Ports and airfields such as at Muscat, Oman (755 nautical miles to Khorramshahr, 200 to Bandar Abbas, by sea); Masirah Island (450 miles to Bandar Abbas by air); Berbera, Somalia (1,520 miles to Bandar Abbas by sea); and Mombasa, Kenya (2,520 miles to Bandar Abbas by sea); might be available in an emergency. But we must have more than last-minute approval to use existing facilities if we are to provide a large joint force with adequate logistic support. The concurrent combat operations of one hundred or more naval combatants, half as many amphibious ships and aux-

iliaries, over 600 land- and sea-based tactical aircraft, and up to three divisions, or over 150,000 troops, ashore, would require a major logistic support effort.

The Navy and Marines are working now to improve the logistic support of tactical units in an expeditionary environment. The program, labeled Amphibious Logistic Support Ashore (ALSA),[10] is intended to use modern technology, such as containers and rigid shelters, to provide support to a landing force until more nearly permanent facilities can be developed. By expanding and adapting this program to meet additional mission needs, the requirement for advanced bases in the early phases of any joint operation can also be satisfied. The success or failure of this effort could have more impact on the outcome of a campaign than the results of any single, dramatic engagement between opposing tactical units.

ALSA consists of two complementary systems. The Navy's contribution is the Amphibious Logistic System (ALS). It consists of both equipment and techniques for unloading containerized cargo, vehicles, and bulk fuel from modern merchantmen in the absence of port facilities, in harbors if possible, off unprotected beaches if necessary. The equipment includes such new items as a crane able to reach up to 150 feet while lifting 35 tons. This can be mounted on the deck of one ship to unload a non-self-sustaining container ship (CONT/N) alongside. (It is useful to think of a fully loaded 20-foot container as weighing about 22 tons and a 40-foot container as weighing about 33½ tons.) Also under development are self-propelled and elevatable causeways, and rubber bladders that can store 135,000 gallons of fuel afloat or ashore. By integrating new and existing equipment, ALS is designed to move dry and liquid cargo from ships offshore to the beach, where the other part of the program, the Marine Corps' Field Logistic System takes over.

Using specialized materials-handling equipment, a family of commercially designed vehicles, and the pipelines of the existing amphibious assault fuel system, the field logistic system moves cargo inland, to where it is needed. A variety of container inserts have been designed for the packaging of supplies in boxes, some of which can be handled easily by two men. In addition to the transportation of supplies, the field logistic system provides shelters of various sizes for the performance of necessary personnel-support and equipment-maintenance functions. They are all dimensionally standardized so that the components of the largest shelters can be transported within the space occupied by 20-foot or 40-foot commercial containers.

Currently ALSA is being developed to support a Marine Amphibious Force. This force, numbering about 50,000, consists of a reinforced division, about

PH1 CARL R. BEGY, USN

Helicopter-borne troops have great mobility while in the air. But, once they are on the ground, they have little tactical maneuverability, especially in open terrain, for while the men can be flown easily, their vehicles cannot. These Marines are returning to their CH-46 helicopters after an exercise on Molokai, an island just east of Oahu in the Hawaiian chain.



The Jeff-B air cushion landing craft in a rough sea. Unlike conventional landing craft, this one can operate over land and, unlike helicopters, can carry heavy equipment, such as tanks. By means of such craft, vast areas of coastline formerly safe from amphibious attack will be opened up to naval exploitation.

120 tactical aircraft, and combat service support for up to 30 days of independent operations. The daily resupply requirements amount to some 1,500 short tons of dry cargo and 15,000 bbls. (about 2,000 short tons) of bulk POL. If fresh water is added to the resupply requirements, as it certainly would be in most of Southwest Asia, as much as 50 gallons per man per day would have to be drilled, distilled, or transported. That is 2.5 million gallons, or 10,000 tons, daily.

To put these numbers in perspective it is worth noting that a single containership of the SL-7 design carries about 1,000 containers, or 22,000 tons. A 40,000-ton tanker carries about 300,000 bbls. of POL products. A single elevated causeway can transfer 200 containers (each with a payload of 20 tons, or 4,000 tons total) per day, and the Amphibious Logistic System can move 24,000 bbls. of bulk fuel to consumers ashore each day. These figures demonstrate that when developed, ALSA will have significant growth potential to support much larger forces in an expeditionary environment. Once logistically supportable courses of action are assured by the existence of suitable advanced bases, operational planners can consider their tactical options.

Modern technology assures us that future amphibious operations against a continental landmass will be very different from those of World War II, whether they occur in Europe or elsewhere. Especially where there are large, open, and lightly held areas behind the coastline, maneuver promises to play a bigger part in tactics than it did in the frontal assaults and battles of attrition that characterized the landings at Tarawa, Pelelieu, Salerno, and Anzio. Inside of 24 hours, an amphibious task force steaming parallel to a hostile shore can cover a distance equal to that from Boston to Washington, D.C. Theater and fleet cover and deception operations can confuse the enemy as to the exact location of a landing until after the buildup ashore is well underway. The initial elements, consisting of reconnaissance and "light infantry" units, can be disembarked from amphibious ships while the latter are still underway and over the horizon from the selected landing site. Helicopters, VSTOL aircraft, and air-cushion landing craft (LCAC), can deliver these troops to unoccupied or lightly held terrain deep inland. Provided they have adequate tactical mobility once on the ground, these forces can carry out the tasks once performed by the cavalry, screening the main force, acting as a covering force for the landing, conducting raids and ambushes to unbalance the enemy, and performing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition missions for long-range air and missile systems.

Though we still have no VSTOL transports, we will get some if and when the Navy's VSTOL-A program gets off the ground. As we have seen, VSTOL aircraft generally have much longer ranges and higher speeds than helicopters do, even while carrying the same payloads. A tilt-rotor prototype such as the XV-15 would carry the same load as the present CH-46 and occupy no more deck area aboard ship. Such a VSTOL transport would be more expensive than current helicopters are because it involves new technology, and it would take ten to fifteen years to get a significant operational capability in the fleet. But since our current helicopters are reaching the end of their useful lives, the question is whether we should invest in new technology or old for their replacements.

Though we now have only two experimental air cushion landing craft (JEFF-A and JEFF-B), the Soviets have over 40 such craft, some of them quite a bit larger than those we are considering. The notional 88-foot LCAC the Marines are using for their studies has the following characteristics compared to conventional landing craft:

	LCM-6	*LCM-8*	*LCU*	*LCAC*
Length	56′	74′	135′	88′
Beam	14′	21′	29′	47′
"Spotting factor"	1.0	1.98	5.0	5.3
Speed	9 kts.	9-12 kts.	11 kts.	35-50 kts.
Cargo area	37′x11′	45′x15′	124′x16′	67′x27′
Cargo capacity	34 tons	65 tons	188 tons	60-75 tons
Medium tank capacity	0	1	3	1

The LCACs would be launched from amphibious ships steaming some 25 miles or more from the landing sites. After crossing the coastline they would

proceed inland along previously reconnoitered routes to near their initial objectives. Then the tanks and other combat vehicles would be disembarked. Obviously, the most efficient ship-to-shore force would be some mix of air and surface craft with the high performance, high cost elements kept to the minimum required to support the scheme of maneuver ashore. The balance of the lighterage requirement could be met by more economical conventional landing craft and LASH or Seabee barges. The optimum mix, of course, would depend on the conditions and circumstances of each individual operation. Consequently, what the services must try for are generally efficient solutions that can serve effectively over a range of missions and situations, rather than optimum solutions for a small number of narrowly conceived events.

It is because of these improved ship-to-shore capabilities and better means of reconnaissance that the first-wave maneuver elements can seize critically important objectives virtually unopposed before the defenders start to react to the landing. Then, as the enemy's armored columns move toward the landing area, long-range weapon systems guided by small, mobile target acquisition teams on the ground can delay, disorganize, and weaken them. In the time gained by tactical surprise and the depth of the initial landings, and while the enemy prepares to mount his counterattack, heavier combat and support units can be put ashore by conventional landing craft and by the lighters serving self-sustaining commercial containerships (CONT/S). This two-sided buildup of combat power in the vicinity of the beachhead thus becomes a race between the opposing forces.

Table 2 *Amphibious Force Capabilities By The Year 2001**

Ship	*No.*	*Troops*	*Vehicles*	*Cargo*	*POL*	*Helos*	*Ldg. Cft.*	*Remarks*
				FORWARD DEPLOYMENT UNIT (DU)				
LHA/LHDX	1	1,800	25Kft^2	120Kft^3	2,200bbls	38	26	4 DUs on Station
LSD-36/41	1	400	12K	12K	800	3	12	Continuously Worldwide
Totals	2	2,200	37Kft^2	132Kft^3	3,000bbls	41	38	
				SURGE CAPABILITY				
LHA/LHDX	9	16,200	225Kft^2	1080Kft^3	19,800bbls	342	234	Capability to mass at asingle
LSD-36/41/LST	11	4,400	145K	90K	50,200	18	76	crisis location without drawdown of three other forward deployments
Totals	20	20,600	370Kft^2	1170Kft^3	70,000bbls	360	310	
				TOTAL MAF LIFT				Based on Retire/Replace Plan Shown in Table 3.
LHA/LHDX	14	25,200	350Kft^2	1680Kft^3	30.8Kbbls	532	364	
LSD-36/41	11	4,400	132K	120K	8.8K	33	132	
LST	6	2,400	90K	24K	56.4K	6	—	
RO/RO	9	—	1575K	—	—	—	—	
CONT/N/S	9	28,000	—	3400K	—	—	100	7 CONT/N Configured as AP, 4000 PAX ea. 2 CONT/S with 50 lighters ea.
AO	4	—	—	—	1,200K	—	—	Not Part of Amphib. Ship plan
Totals	53	60,000	2.15Mft^2	5.2Mft^3	1.3Mbbls	571	596	
% MAF		1.2	1.4	1.7	2.2	1.6	1.7	
(1 MAF)		(50,000)	(1.5 Mft^2)	(3.0 Mft^3)	(600K bbls)	(350 CH-46)	(350 LCM-6)	Current norm, may change with changes in weapons, equipment & tactics

*Ship characteristics shown in this table are approximations taken from a variety of unclassified sources. The MAF defined in terms of its lift "footprint" is a notional task organization such as that used at the Marine Corps Education Center. The values of its dimensions are also approximations.

The roll-on, roll-off ships, containerships, and tankers shown under "Total MAF Lift" could be manned by civilian contract crews under the Military Sealift Command, by full regular Navy crews, or by nucleus regular Navy crews who could be augmented rapidly by personnel from shore stations or by naval reservists. In any major contingency, whether the action takes place in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or anywhere else, additional ships, taken from commercial use, would be needed.

Table 3 *Amphibious Ship Retirement And Replacement Plan (1981-2001)**

Type	*No.*	*82*	*83*	*84*	*85*	*86*	*87*	*88*	*89*	*90*	*91*	*92*	*93*	*94*	*95*	*96*	*97*	*98*	*99*	*00*	*01*
LSD-28	8			−1	−3	−2	−2														
LPH	7										−1	−1	−1		−1	−1			−1	−1	
LPD	15											−1	−1	−1	−2	−1	−2		−2	−2	−3
LSD-36	5																		−1		−2
LST	20																		−1	−7	−6
LHA	5																				
Total	60																				
LSD-41	(New)			+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
LHDX	(Constr.)				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1
RO/RO				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
CONT/N/S				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
Net:																					
Du	12			12	13	13	14	14	15	15	15	14	14	14	14	13	14	14	14	13	14
Ships	60			62	60	61	60	63	64	67	67	68	67	69	67	68	67	70	66	59	49

Resource Summary (FY 1981 Dollars)

SCN (Incl. investment for LCAC & ALS) = $720M/YR. (12% of the total SCN appropriation)
(45% Sealift TOA compared to 1962-1981 Avg. of investment-to-TOA of 48% Airlift, 36% Sealift)

Sealift (Amphibs. + Merships) TOA = $1.6B/YR (40% of the Mobility Forces TOA compared to 20Yr Avg. of 34%)

Projection Forces TOA Mobility Forces = $4.0B/YR (Compared to 20 yr. Avg. of $4.1B, FY 1981 Program of $3.6B, FY81-85 Estimate of $4.25B/YR)

M = Millions
B = Billions
SCN = Ship Construction, Navy
LCAC = Loading craft, air cushion
ALS = Amphibious logistic system
TOA = Total obligational authority
Avg = Average

*The schedule of ship retirements is that published by Headquarters Marine Corps. The proposed new construction schedule is designed to maintain between 12 and 16 deployment units, keep the total force at least at its current strength, and accomplish both objectives at the level of resource allocation shown in the resource summary. Unit costs used to arrive at these estimates are: LSD-41-$350M, LHDX-$700M, RO/RO and CONT/N/S-$185M each. In the years that an LHDX is procured, $20M is available for investment in LCAC and ALS components. The two years that show no ship acquisitions (1982 and '83) are left blank to allow for startup time, but the resources they represent (about $1.5B in investment) can be applied to programs like LCAC and ALS that are ready for quantity production now. Perfectly level funding profiles neither could nor should be maintained over twenty years, and other management actions would be necessary before we could achieve a ratio of sealift investment to operating expenses of .45-to-.55, but this is not a detailed procurement program ready for implementation. It is intended to stimulate informed discussion.

Neither LCCs nor LKAs are shown on this table.

The LCCs are already being used as fleet flagships. If we mount a major amphibious operation in either ocean area, at least one of these ships would probably be on the scene anyway. For lesser operations, the C^3I requirements can probably be met by building equipment into the ships used for the regular sustained deployments. The same capabilities needed for crisis management can be designed to support amphibious operations.

Even now the LKAs, all of which are partly manned by reservists, are unavailable to us on short notice. Since essentially they are break-bulk cargo ships, they are less critical to the total amphibious capability than ships with a large vehicle square or aviation capacity. So long as the ALSA capability is developed, by the year 2001 the cargo requirements can be satisfied by containerships.

The numbers in the horizontal line, DU, show how many such deployment units we would have in each year of the transition period. The current number, 12, is based on possession of 7 LPH and 5 LHA, allowing one aviation-capable ship for each DU. There are enough other ships to satisfy the LSD requirement, which is also for one such ship in each DU. Over the years we never quite reach the number 16 needed to support four DUs on station at the 4:1 ratio. We also never quite get down to the 32-ship level (16 LHDX and 16 LSD-41) because by 2001 we will still have two LSD-36 class and six LSTs in the force. The 18 merchant ships (RO/RO and containerships) are intended to make up the balance of the sealift force in a more economical way than trying to replace our current amphibious ships, when they wear out, on a one-for-one basis.

The advantage will likely go to that force which has gained the initiative, i.e., the landing force, provided it can maintain its momentum.

The elements needed to implement this tactical concept are already to be found in our land and tactical air forces. Helicopter-borne forces are best suited for the development and defense of strong points in open terrain because of their limited tactical mobility once they are on the ground. When the terrain is too rough for armored warfare airmobile infantry units can be used as maneuver elements, provided they can maintain tactical mobility superior to the enemy's. An example of such employment might be the use of helicopter-borne ski troops in Norway.

But for offensive operations in Southwest Asia, a landing force needs to be able to form mechanized, combined-arms task forces. These units can be carried by air cushion landing craft across any flat stretch of coastline, and moved inland along such avenues as rivers and salt flats. Carrying a 60-ton tank at 50 knots, the current JEFF-B has an endurance of four hours in sea state 2. If the technology of light armored vehicles is combined with this revolutionary landing craft even greater tactical advantages can be realized.

The aviation combat element of the landing force must also be specially configured if it is to be fully "mission capable." It should be seen for what it is—the landward extension of naval aviation. At times it will be the only tactical aviation available to support ground units. At other times it may be needed to support the operations of other fleet units in adjacent seas. Because of these diverse mission requirements, landing force aviation should possess the full range of air support capabilities, from anti-air warfare to close air support of ground units. It should also be able to operate from the decks of amphibious ships and from expeditionary bases ashore. To achieve this flexibility and minimize its dependence on established air bases, VSTOL technology should be pushed to the utmost in the re-equipping and modernization of landing force aviation.

All these proposed changes in equipment and doctrine will ultimately result in changes in amphibious lift and ship-to-shore movement requirements. Table 2 summarizes what our active amphibious force, including immediately available merchant ships, might look like in the year 2001 if the ideas that have been discussed so far are acted upon. The LHDX designation (called the LXA in some studies) is used as an example of something on the drawing boards that could be modified to support the concepts developed. The RO/RO and containership designs referred to are current commercial capabilities. They could be "navalized" for a modest cost and could be converted to different uses by the application of new technology (e.g. containerized shelter technology combined with a 28,800-ton, 33-knot SL-7 equals an AP with a capacity of 4,000 passengers). Table 2 represents only one of several possible combinations. Evolution in landing force weapons and tactics might lead to different results. Change is necessary, desirable, and inevitable. Will it be rational and orderly, or not?

Table 4 *Using the Suez Canal*

From	*Closure Time in Days*	*Cumulative Force (DWT)*
Mid-Mediterranean (1/9)	10	1/9
Okinawa (2/9)	18	3/9
Norfolk (3/9)	24	6/9
San Diego (3/9)	31	9/9

Not Using the Suez Canal

From	*Closure Time in Days*	*Cumulative Force (DWT)*
Okinawa (2/9)	18	2/9
Mid-Mediterranean (1/9)	26	3/9
San Diego (3/9)	31	6/9
Norfolk (3/9)	32	9/9

If we assume it takes four days to embark a MAB-size force at Norfolk, San Diego, or Okinawa, and if we assume an 18-knot speed of advance, a division-wing team can be placed at Al Basrah, Iraq, at the head of the Persian Gulf in 31 days using the Suez Canal. Without the use of the canal, the task would take 32 days.

In an attempt to demonstrate that the changes proposed could be accomplished in an orderly and deliberately planned way over the next twenty years, I have developed the amphibious ship retirement and replacement plan shown in Table 3. This plan is based on the anticipated retirement of our current ships as each reaches the end of thirty years' service. Its objective is to maintain our ability to lift and project combat forces ashore, and to do it at a reasonable cost. If the Defense Department and the Congress are convinced that the nation needs the kind of capabilities discussed in this essay, the comparisons show this can be done.

Conclusion

In the four centuries since Drake attacked the Spanish base at Santo Domingo, amphibious warfare has been both the ultimate offensive application of sea power and a useful operational capability with which to support a strategically defensive campaign. Over the past four decades it is apparent that World

War II experience has strongly influenced our impressions on the subject.

My aim has been to suggest a different way of looking at the need for and the problems of getting a landing force ashore—a way that would make more sense to civilian policymakers than the current rationale used in amphibious force planning. That rationale, to be able to lift a full Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF, for a classical assault, has resulted over the years in amphibious lift dropping from enough to lift 2 MAFs to barely enough to lift only the assault echelon of 1.15 MAF. In this age of deterrence, the maintenance and continued development of the ability to take a variety of military initiatives against an opponent is the modern equivalent of that traditional principle of war, the offensive. This is a different principle than that upon which the RDF is based, and the tactical and logistical capabilities of airlifted and sealifted projection forces clearly reflect this difference in principle.

While the RDF depends upon speed of movement to reception facilities under friendly control, so as to respond rapidly to a friendly government's invitation to intervene, amphibious forces are trained, organized, and equipped to seize control of and hold reception areas or any other facilities that may be needed in an objective area. For their responsiveness, the latter depend on early deployment to, and the ability to loiter near, a trouble spot. It is obvious that these qualities are complementary. By airlifting troops, we can move a light airborne division with about five days of supplies from the United States to Southwest Asia and do it in two weeks. At the end of those two weeks, the first troops to arrive will have had to be resupplied twice with food and water. If heavier units and fuel, ammunition, and water for combat operations are required, they will probably have to be transported by ship. Moreover, after the troops have gotten themselves sorted out and reconfigured into tactical organizations, they may depend on ships or landing craft to get them to where they are really needed. A seaborne force with thirty days of sustaining supplies can move to the same area in twice the time. (See Table 4.) Both forces would need the support of advanced bases and secure shipping routes if they had to engage in combat. Because they are complementary, both projection capabilities should receive balanced consideration by strategists and programmers.

But in a big bureaucracy like DOD the competition for limited resources often muddies the waters of rational decision-making. To ensure that the consideration is balanced, related and complementary mission capabilities need advocates of comparable stature and "clout" within the bureaucracy. This is why the Commander, Military Sealift Command, should be a specified commander coequal with CinCMAC. He would act as the advocate of all our national sealift programs—amphibious, USNS, and privately owned U. S.-flag merchant shipping.

The mission is a naval mission—both traditional and newly urgent. If we let it slide, in twenty years our capability will dwindle to less than half of what it now is. But if we act with intelligence and vigor, we can have a powerful, versatile, and mobile force, all at a price far less than we will have to pay if we try to get by in some other way. The naval service owes it to the maritime nation it serves.

The time for action is now.

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[1]West, "A Fleet for the Year 2000", U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1980, p. 75.

[2]Krulak, "The U. S. Marine Corps," U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1980, p. 102.

[3]DOD Instr. 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense," 1958.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]JCS Pub. 1, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, 1974.

[6]NWP-22 (B), *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, 1967, p. 1-3.

[7]This definition of strategy and its relation to tactics and logistics is taken from Henry Eccles' treatment of the same subjects in *Military Power in a Free Society* (Naval War College, 1979, pp. 61-73.)

[8]The estimate of resources allocated to amphibious warfare capabilities is based on the following approximate values of 20 year averages of annual TOA in FY 1981 dollars.

Total DOD		*Amphibious "System" only*	
Land forces (divisions) plus land-based tactical aviation	≈ $30B	USMC division forces plus tactical aviation	≈ $3B
Mobility forces (airlift, sealift & amphibious forces)	≈ 4B	Amphibious forces & sealift	≈ 1.4B
Total	$34B		4.4B (13%)

[9]Estimates based on data contained in Millard & Grike, *Amphibious Force Capabilities for Non-Combatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC) Operations* (Center for Naval Analyses, Jan. 1979).

[10]The description of ALSA which follows is taken from a briefing prepared by HQMC (Code LM) and NAVFAC (Code 032) in August 1977 and updated in July 1979. Logistic planning factors are from FM 101-10-1, *Staff Ofnicers' Field Manual. Organizational. Technical and Logistic Data* (Dept of the Army, July 1976).



1982 Honorable Mention

"Lejeune of the Naval Service"

Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret)

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Lejeune of the Naval Service

By Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr.
U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)

1982
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

COURTESY OF NAVAL ACADEMY ARCHIVES

Naval Cadet Lejeune, 1884

U. S. MARINE CORPS

Colonel Lejeune, 1913

God and man both tried, but neither could deprive the U. S. Marine Corps of its 13th Commandant.

John Archer Lejeune was born 10 January 1867. He was taught at home by his mother until, at the age of 13, he went to a boarding school in Natchez, Mississippi. When the USS *Alliance* visited that city, Lejeune visited the ship. He was impressed by her smartness and her crew in full dress uniform. Among those on board was First Lieutenant George F. Elliott, later Major General Commandant of the Corps. Seeing the Marine officer's double-breasted frock coat and his sky-blue trousers, Lejeune left filled with dreams of trips across trackless oceans in ships flying the American flag.

From Natchez, Lejeune went to Louisiana State University. As a sophomore, he applied to the Naval Academy, which he entered in 1884 at the age of 17. Like most of the cadets of the period, he soon received a nickname. Lejeune's ancestors had gone from France to Nova Scotia and were resettled during the French and Indian War. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow later immortalized the resettlement in "Evangeline," a poem about the life-long search for the lost Gabriel Lajeunesse by his sweetheart. As a plebe at the Academy, Lejeune had to memorize the epic and recite it to upperclassmen. The association of plebe and poem and the similarity of surnames earned him the nickname of Gabriel. He was "Gabe" the rest of his life.

On 8 June 1888, Lejeune was graduated from the Academy. His class would go to sea as passed midshipmen for two years, then assemble for examinations to fix class standing and determine future assignments. Lejeune went first to Mare Island for duty in the USS *Mohican*, then transferred in mid-January 1889 to the screw sloop *Vandalia*. She was to join Rear Admiral Louis A. Kimberly's Pacific Squadron in Apia, Samoa. Samoa and the Hawaiians were the last important islands in the Pacific not yet under foreign control. Trouble flared when the Germans attempted to gain control of one of the independent Polynesian kingdoms of Samoa. During the voyage south, Lejeune began the love affair of a lifetime when he commanded a pivot gun manned by marines.

The *Vandalia* put into Apia on 22 February 1889. The harbor teemed with men-of-war. The USS *Nipsic* was the only other American until the *Trenton*, Kimberly's flagship, arrived a few days later. A modern cruiser, HMS *Calliope*, represented the Queen. The Kaiser's squadron comprised the cruiser *Olga* and gunboats *Adler* and *Eber*. Several sailing traders were present as well. It had been quiet since December, and then the situation was turned upside down by an act of God.

On 14 March, a typhoon hit. Preparations were made to ride out the blow. Boilers were lit off and masts and rigging secured. Lejeune had the midwatch on the forecastle. He secured himself with a line and waited through the night. Dawn showed that the harbor had been badly battered; most ships had dragged anchor. Included was the *Vandalia*, for her engines couldn't hold against the sea. She drifted down on the *Calliope*'s ram, cleared it, and finally grounded 200 yards offshore. Waves pounded her, so Lejeune and others took to the rigging where their ordeal lasted several hours before they were rescued. The common experience made the adversaries forget the warlike tension, and a potential international crisis passed.

After surviving the disaster in Samoa, Lejeune returned to San Francisco. He finished his sea tour in the USS *Adams* and made another cruise to Samoa. He was happy to leave for Annapolis in March 1890 for final examinations. Lejeune had decided upon the Marine Corps and was confident of the assignment. He explained his rationale:

". . . I arrived at my choice chiefly by a process of elimination. First of all, I promptly eliminated the Engineer Corps, because I had no bent for mechanical engineering. The choice between the Line of the Navy and the Marine Corps was much more difficult . . . I liked going to sea occasionally but not for the greater part of my life; I preferred the military to the naval side of my profession; . . . and most important of all, I realized that whatever ability I had lay in the direction of handling and controlling men rather than . . . handling and controlling machinery. From my own standpoint, therefore, the Marine Corps seemed to possess more advantages and less disadvantages than did the other branches of the naval service; and I made my decision accordingly."

Lejeune did very well on the examinations standing 13th of 35 in his class. He did so well, in fact, that Commodore George W. Melville, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, insisted that the academic board assign Lejeune to the Engineer Corps. He was considered too high in the class for the Marines. His pleas to superiors in the chain of command did no good, so he decided to go out of official channels. He visited Senators Randall Gibson and William Eaton Chandler. The latter was being beseeched by a classmate, H. O. Stickney, for a waiver of vision standards and a commission in the Engineer Corps. Lejeune offered his slot *if* he could get the Marine Corps. They called on Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy. Lejeune was introduced as a survivor of the *Vandalia*. The case was presented logically and concisely. Tracy rang for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation: "Commodore, I want this young man assigned to the Marine Corps." And so he was, thus foiling an Act of Man to keep him out of the Corps.

In the midst of a period of alternating tours of duty at sea and shore following his commissioning in 1890, Lejeune married Miss Ellie Murdaugh in October 1895. For his next sea duty, he requested the *Maine* but was assigned instead to the *Cincinnati*. When the executive officer of the *Cincinnati* told him that the duties of the marines on board would be curtailed, Lejeune appealed to the commanding officer for increased duties. His request was granted. This action was the first manifestation of Lejeune's life-long belief that the Navy needed marines—troops familiar with shipboard life and naval ways, able to conduct land operations in support of naval campaigns. Conversely, marines could not exist without a Navy. He was to build a new Marine Corps on that simple fact.

The *Cincinnati* was up the Amazon when news came of the *Maine*'s destruction at Havana. The fickleness of assignments had kept the young officer from sharing her fate. His ship was involved in no action during the Spanish-American War, but when it was over he benefited through quick promotion from a law doubling the size of the Marine Corps.

A flurry of short assignments followed: an examining board in Washington; recruiting duty in New England; and command of the marine barracks at Pensacola. In January 1903, as a major, he was aide to the Adjutant and Inspector. Then he took command of the "floating battalion" on board the USS *Panther* and was thus introduced to a forerunner of the Fleet Marine Force. Lejeune tried to work out satisfactory arrangements for training his men for service ashore—their primary mission—rather than the daily requirements of shipboard routine. He did not succeed until the battalion shifted to the USS *Dixie*. By then he had worked out a viable plan for embarked troops. It was adopted by an enlightened skipper who wished to get the job done. The *Dixie* landed her marines at Colon, Panama, and the battalion became part of the 1st Marines in the brigade commanded by George F. Elliott, the Brigadier General Commandant. In Panama, Lejeune successfully commanded his first large unit under adverse conditions of climate, environment, and sanitation.

By 1909, after further duty both in this country and overseas, Lejeune had been commissioned almost 20 years and was a lieutenant colonel. He had a fine service reputation for both energy and intelligence. He was a forward thinker. Thus, it was no surprise that his next assignment was discussed with him personally by General Elliott. He was assigned to the Army War College, returning to school for the first time since 1890.

He adopted Army procedures and by his own assertion was for all intents and purposes an Army officer during this period. There was one feature of the course that Lejeune particularly enjoyed. He felt the tactical rides to Civil War battlefields were most educational. The end of the course brought an outstanding report on his performance to General Elliott. It had a far-reaching effect on Lejeune's career and his subsequent assignment to France with the Army.

Graduation sent him to command the 500-man barracks at Brooklyn. There he encountered a discipline problem from drunkenness and post-payday absences. The new commanding officer, never one for slackness, immediately tightened ship.

Then in October 1913, came a flattering surprise. William P. Biddle, Elliott's successor as Commandant, asked to retire. The chief of the Bureau of Navigation invited Lejeune to be interviewed by

Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels as a candidate. Probably because of his rank and age, he was not nominated, but he was recognized as having potential. Colonel George Barnett became the 12th Commandant in early 1914.

While Lejeune was at Brooklyn (1909-14), the "floating battalion" which he had led into Panama helped further the Marine Corps as a vital arm of the fleet. Technology had changed the entire role of marines within the naval service. Long-range guns opened up the distances at which ships engaged. There was no need for riflemen in the rigging to rake enemy decks. Sail had given way to steam. Steam required coal which had to be stocked at advanced bases. Bases had to be defended or, if not ours, seized and defended. Marines had a new mission.

In 1913, the General Board and the War College planned the 1914 fleet maneuvers. As part of the exercise, the Advanced Base Force was to occupy and defend the Caribbean island Culebra as a fleet base. On Thanksgiving Day, Lejeune was ordered to whip the 2nd Marines (previously a regiment only on paper) into shape at Pensacola. Captain William F. Fullam, USN, never a lover of marines, was anxious to command the Advance Base Force. He argued that marines needed outside "urging" and "driving" to accomplish such a mission. Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger, commanding the Atlantic Fleet, disagreed. He was vindicated by the success of the marines.

The force returned to Pensacola. The brigade commander, Barnett, left to become Commandant. Barnett offered Lejeune the post of Assistant Commandant. Lejeune asked for a delay, feeling that there was trouble coming in Mexico. Marines would be in action, and Lejeune wanted to be with them. Ships' detachments were sent ashore to deal with troubles at Tampico and Veracruz. Army Major General Frederick Funston commanded ashore. Lejeune suggested to Admiral Badger, an old shipmate from the *Cincinnati*, that the ships' detachments reembark but that the Advance Base Force remain with the Army. Approval was secured from Washington. When Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller arrived to command the brigade, Lejeune resumed command of the 2nd Marines. Service with the Army was good experience.

The return from Mexico brought the duty proposed by Barnett. On 2 January 1915, Lejeune became Assistant Commandant. In his first six months, with the Commandant away, Lejeune was called upon by the Navy to provide an expeditionary force for immediate service in Haiti. A fine point in amphibious command relationships was solved for future reference. Colonel Waller was ready to command all troops of the brigade ashore. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton desired that control of each unit ashore be vested in the commanding officer of the ship at anchor off that town. Lejeune appealed to Caperton's fleet superior, Admiral William Benson, that the principle of unity of command ashore be maintained. Benson overruled Caperton. The Haitian brigade was under a single commander. Marines gained fighting experience and the Corps a combat reputation.

Two other problems, ones which did not involve combat, were ably handled by Lejeune during that period. The first was personnel. He and Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt came up with a bill as part of the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916. The Marine Corps was increased to 15,000 with the President authorized to add 2,400 more. It also meant immediate promotion to brigadier general for Lejeune. A major recruiting effort was made to fill the expanded ranks. The second problem was that of facilities for an expanded Corps. Marines had been scattered in barracks and detachments in navy yards. The innovation of having the 2nd Marines in readiness in the Philadelphia Navy Yard had shown its value during the expedition to Haiti in 1915. Navy yards, however, are industrial complexes serving the fleet. They lack terrain for training. Thus, marines were authorized to acquire facilities at San Diego and at Quantico.

When war was declared in April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson astonished the nation by calling for an Army of 1.5 million men. It was decided to send an Army division and a Marine regiment to France at once. Lejeune now faced a dilemma. He had long been an advocate of the Marine Corps as an arm of the Navy, but the nation was now committed to a land war in Europe. Gallipoli had ruined the case for amphibious war, and European fleets did not need advanced bases. Yet, if the Corps was to survive, it needed to be part of the action. Daniels solved part of the problem by detaching the 5th and 6th Marines for service with the Army. Lejeune's new problem was how to get to France.

The first step was to leave Washington. Barnett was suspicious of his motives, but Lejeune convinced him of his genuine desire to lead marines in action. In September 1917, Lejeune went to Quantico to train marines for service with the Allied armies. New regiments were formed, and the 4th Marine Brigade went to France. Thinkers at Quantico talked of a full Marine division. Lejeune saw merit in the idea and hoped to implement it overseas. First he had to get there.

Opportunity came when the brigade commander, Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, was invalided home. Lejeune assured Barnett that if sent, he would fare well. He knew General John J. Pershing and Brigadier General James G. Harbord, two Army officers he had encountered in the Philippines; War College classmates were in high places. In late May, he sailed; with him was Earl H. "Pete" Ellis, with whom he had served on Barnett's small staff and at Quantico. General Pershing interviewed Lejeune

U. S. MARINE CORPS

Major General Lejeune, 1918

U. S. MARINE CORPS

Commandant Lejeune, 1922

COURTESY OF EUGENIE LEJEUNE

Last photo in uniform, 1940

and turned down the idea of a Marine division. In mid-June, Lejeune visited the 4th Marine Brigade fresh from Belleau Wood. He talked to their commander, Army Brigadier General Harbord. In July, Lejeune got the 64th Brigade of the 32nd Infantry Division. Ellis was his operations officer.

On 14 July, Harbord was promoted to command the 2nd Infantry Division. Command of its Marine Brigade was open, and it went to Lejeune on 25 July. Three days later, Harbord sent for him. Pershing had ordered Harbord to straighten out the service of supply, and Harbord recommended that Lejeune succeed him in command of the 2nd Infantry Division. The only problem was rank. The latest naval appropriation act had provided for another major general. The President promoted Lejeune with immediate effect.

By September, the 2nd Infantry Division had replaced the men who suffered from the heavy casualties of the summer battles at Soissons and Belleau Wood. From the 12th to 17th, it led the attack to reduce the St. Mihiel salient. Because of headlines, Belleau Wood was the legendary Marine Corps action of World War I. More decisive and just as deadly was the fighting of October 1918. The division jumped off on 3 October toward Blanc Mont. In seven days, the division accomplished what the French hadn't been able to do in four years—broken the German position and forced a 40-kilometer retreat. The 2nd Division returned to the 1st Army.

The Meuse-Argonne offensive had stalled. To get it going, Lejeune's division was to lead the assault of the forward corps. They moved out after heavy artillery preparation. Initial objectives fell quickly, and their advance through the Hindenberg Line became a stern chase. The day before the Armistice, the 5th Marines were across the Meuse.

The guns fell silent. Lejeune led his division back to New York in the summer of 1919 and then reported to Quantico, relieving Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. Then Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels dropped a bombshell. To the surprise of all, especially General Barnett, he announced that on 1 July 1920, John A. Lejeune would become the Major General Commandant. The appointment was part of the President's policy to reward promising officers for war service. The Senate adjourned before confirming Lejeune. Despite the lack of assurance of tenure in the job, the new Commandant turned to.

It was a demanding job to offset the postwar letdown and keep the Corps functioning and ready for expeditionary service with the Navy. The 5th and 6th Marines were reorganized and in readiness at Quantico. The principle under which Lejeune operated was simple: "The good of the Corps, combined with the just treatment of all officers and men, was paramount and, therefore took precedence over all other considerations." From this flowed many things. Officers' military education was essential. Hence schools were established: at Philadelphia for second lieutenants; at Quantico, one for company grade and one for field grade officers. Athletics, especially baseball and football, were stressed. They helped morale and provided exposure which re-

cruited the men the Marine Corps wanted. The minimum age was raised to 21 and physical standards were rigid. Enlisted marines finally became eligible for the Naval Academy.

The Harding administration was about to replace the Democrats. The new secretary was Edwin Denby. He had enlisted in the Marine Corps, been commissioned, and fought at Blanc Mont. He asked Lejeune to stay. Thus, the day after inauguration, 5 March 1921, Lejeune was confirmed by the Senate for a four-year term. Among the things facing him were problems within the officer ranks. War expansion saw many officers, particularly in France, promoted rapidly. Adjustments were required. What Lejeune wanted but never got was a selection system such as the one the Navy had had since 1916. Despite repeated requests, the Corps was stuck with a system of rigid seniority. Promotions depended on deaths, resignations, or retirements.

While Lejeune was adjusting the Marine Corps to peacetime, he was also directing its preparations for the next war. Wendell "Buck" Neville, a future commandant, headed a planning section. "Pete" Ellis was chief planner. He produced a document called "Operation Plan 712, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia." Lejeune approved it on 23 July 1921. It was more concept and philosophy than the detailed plans we think of today. It began prophetically: "In order to impose our will upon Japan, it will be necessary for us to project our fleet and land forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters." It reflected naval thinking, particularly what was being taught at the Naval War College. Thus, it accurately gave a scheme of maneuver of a drive across the central Pacific to Japan, defeating Japan's fleet and leaving that country at the mercy of our naval power. The Pacific war was going to be a naval campaign, and OpPlan 712 spelled out the land operations required of marines to seize and defend advanced bases for the fleet. It is a remarkable document and a definitive testimony to Lejeune's belief in the position of marines within the naval service. In 1922, landing exercises were held on Culebra; in 1923 in Panama. These were the prelude to ones on a broader scale. A brigade was in the 1924 fleet exercises. Marines were developing doctrine for the years ahead.

It was not all development and training. Trouble came in bundles. China and Nicaragua erupted in 1927. Expeditions were mounted for both. China turned into a show of force lasting a year. Nicaragua would be a six-year struggle against the *sandinistas* and the jungle and a training ground for World War II combat leaders.

By 1929, Lejeune had served two full terms and part of a third as Commandant but had not reached mandatory retirement age. Friends wanted him to stay on. He demurred and on 5 March 1929, after more than 45 years in uniform, retired. He had first planned to stay on active duty, but he was offered the superintendency of Virginia Military Institute. He remained there until 1937, inspiring half of a generation and doubtlessly recruiting many for his Corps. He was still physically fit when he decided to step down because he ". . . had reached the magical Bibical age of three score and ten."

In April 1942, Congress authorized that officers who had served with distinction be recognized, and in August Lejeune was promoted to lieutenant general on the retired list. That same month, his long-held dream for the Marine Corps came true when the 1st Marine Division landed on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. The mission was to seize, occupy, and defend an advanced base, Henderson Field. The battle for the Solomons became one of the longest naval campaigns in our history. Marines were responsible for many of the land operations involved. Later, marines followed the path of OpPlan 712 across the Central Pacific to help the fleet advance steadily toward Japanese waters.

After a three-week illness, Lieutenant General John Archer Lejeune, United States Marine Corps (Retired), died on 20 November 1942 in Union Methodist Hospital, Baltimore. He was survived by his widow, three daughters, and tens of thousands of marines, many yet unborn.

Colonel Hammond was graduated from the Naval Academy in 1951. As a platoon leader he was wounded in Korea. Subsequently, he was an instructor at Basic School, company commander, aide to Major General David M. Shoup in 3d Marine Division, and editor and publisher of the *Marine Corps Gazette*. He commanded 2d Battalion 4th Marines in Vietnam until wounded; when recovered, he was plans officer, 3d Marine Division. He instructed at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, was public affairs officer and then plans officer of Fleet Marine Force Pacific. He retired in 1975. Colonel Hammond has an M.A. (International Law) from Catholic University and an M.A. (Journalism) from the University of Nevada-Reno. He is now enrolled in a doctoral program in American history and writing *The Treaty Navy*, a history of the naval services between the two World Wars.

The major factor of true military discipline consists of securing the voluntary cooperation of subordinates, thereby reducing the number of infractions of the laws and regulations to a minimum [and] by laying down the doctrine that the true test of the existence of a high state of discipline in a military organization is found in its cheerful and satisfactory performance of duty under all service conditions—**John A. Lejeune**



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"Iwo Jima"

Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.

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Iwo Jima

1982
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A Marine correspondent recalls the deadliest battle of the Pacific war

by Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *In October, 1944, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after having engineered two years of island-hopping fighting in the Pacific from Guadalcanal to Guam, decided to take on the Japanese-held island of Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands just 660 miles south of Tokyo. Shaped like a pork chop, the island was just five miles long and two and a half miles wide at its broadest point; at its narrow southern tip lay a dormant volcano, Mount Suribachi; north of Suribachi lay three Japanese airfields, two complete and one under construction—and that was the problem. Iwo lay halfway between Tokyo and American air bases on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian in the Mariana Islands. American bombers making the 1,500-mile run to Tokyo were being seriously harassed by Japanese fighters from Iwo; and crippled bombers returning from Tokyo needed a place to put down.*

On February 19, 1945, after more than two months of steady air and naval bombardment, Iwo Jima was invaded by the first wave of the three Marine divisions assigned to the task. Originally it had been assumed that it would not be more difficult to take than islands that had preceded it. The assumption was wrong. The Japanese, under Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, had constructed an astoundingly complex and well-fortified network of artillery positions and pillboxes all over the island, many of them connected by underground tunnels and all of them protected by tons of concrete and volcanic ash—and very few of these defenses had been seriously damaged by weeks of bombardment.

The result was some of the most vicious and costly fighting of the war Iwo Jima was not secured until after twenty-six days of almost constant carnage. There were 6,318 Americans killed and 19,189 wounded in the action; more than 20,000 Japanese died. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., a former editor of this magazine, was there; what follows is his personal account of those twenty-six days of horror.

My affair with Iwo began late in 1944. I was then a staff sergeant with the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, on Guam. What seemed like a lifetime before, I had enlisted in the Marines, received my boot training at Parris Island, South Carolina, and because of a pre-war career as a newspaperman with the New York *Herald Tribune* and as a radio news director for the Mutual network, had been sent from Parris Island to Marine headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, for training as a combat correspondent.

My orientation in the mechanics of copy flow from front-line outfits to command ships and rear-echelon distribution points lasted a couple of months, and when I went overseas to join the fighting in the Solomon Islands, I carried not only all the combat gear of a Marine enlisted man but an awesome array of journalistic paraphernalia. In my transport pack, among skivvies, socks, shirts, and rations, were a flat portable Hermes typewriter (later shattered on Guam by a Japanese mortar fragment that otherwise would have split my back), typewriter paper, carbons, notebooks, and pencils. In addition, I was one of several combat correspondents who was to try to record eyewitness descriptions of battle for use on the networks and radio stations back home. So I also lugged with me a heavy tape recorder, a twelve-volt storage battery and converter for power, and a sea bag full of tapes, repair equipment, wires, microphones, spare needles, and condoms with which to sheath the mikes against saltwater and South Pacific humidity.

Somehow I got all this gear across the Pacific to New Caledonia and then to the Solomon Islands. When I finally caught up with the 3rd Division, my burdens were eased: I was assigned a jeep to carry around the load of recording equipment whenever we moved or went into action and was also given the help of a Seabee, Electrician's Mate Second Class John Wheaton, who operated the equipment while I talked into a hand microphone. Together we made hundreds of recordings—first on Guadalcanal, then in the Marshall Islands, and finally in the Marianas—that were played over American radio stations and networks.

Toward the end of 1944 we were on Guam—now securely in American hands—and wondering where we were going next. To many Marines in the Pacific, it seemed that we were always just getting on a ship or getting off one. Hung with combat gear, blanket roll, pack, and entrenching tools, we were masters of the cargo nets, clambering up or down the sides of transports, hands on the vertical ropes, feet on the horizontal ones, and every so often in heavy swells, hanging upside down and searching for the next foothold. One day we got the word: We were going to Formosa. Relief maps made of rubber were laid out, and it looked horrible. We were going to land on the east side of that big island in a huge wilderness of

OPPOSITE PAGE: *A view of the landing as it must have looked from the heights of Mount Suribachi, painted by the Marine artist Chesley Bonestell in 1945. At left is correspondent Josephy at work.*

OPPOSITE PAGE: U.S. MARINE CORPS ART COLLECTION; LEFT: U.S. MARINE CORPS

forests, mountains, head-hunters, and poisonous snakes. We would be "expendables" used to establish a beachhead for a huge force of Army divisions that would come in over our corpses and fight their way across the island to the west side, where the cities were.

There were long faces among our men. Many had been in the Pacific for more than two years, fighting in tropical jungles and swamps. They had that faraway expression in their eyes that we called "Asiatic"; they were on the verge of cracking up from combat fatigue. They had seen just too much of battle and death; many hardly ever spoke. Earlier in the year some had set their minds on being rotated home after the Guam operation. They wrote poems about replacements still in the United States and, to the tune of *Embraceable You*, sang, "Replace me, I can't go home without you," reassuring themselves that, at least, they would be "home alive in forty-five." As Guam ended, and we realized that someone was working up another operation for us, the saying changed to "the Golden Gate in forty-eight."

Then the attack on Formosa suddenly was called off. We had no idea what was happening, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff had switched strategy. Formosa was going to be ignored, and a new attack was going to be aimed right at the inner defenses of Japan itself. Soon afterward we learned that we were going to be in on the new campaign, but not as assault troops. Two other Marine divisions, the 4th and 5th, would make the beachhead attack on wherever it was we were headed, and we of the 3rd Division would merely go along in the rear as "floating reserve." If all went well, we would not even have to land. We would turn around and sail back and then, probably, most of our men would at last be replaced and rotated home for a well-earned furlough.

Our spirits lifted immediately, and the Asiatic looks of many disappeared magically. We stepped up our drilling and maneuvers, and everybody on Guam (it was now teeming with Army, Navy, and Air Force units) knew we were again preparing to go somewhere.

When we began to load ships, I suddenly was transferred from my own outfit, the 21st Marines, to the Division Headquarters Company, the explanation being that if any one unit of our division did have to get into the battle, our division commander, Major General Graves B. Erskine, would go with it. By being on the same ship with General Erskine, I, as a combat correspondent, would be able to land with whatever part of the division went into action.

Division Headquarters was assigned to a former passenger liner that had been converted to an APA (troop transport) early in the war and already had carried men to many operations. Soon after we sailed, we were collected in units in the holds and on deck and told by our officers that we were going to take Iwo Jima. The contour and rubber relief maps we were shown gave little idea of how hard it was going to be, but the plan was for our 4th and 5th Divisions to land abreast on the black, volcanic sands of the eastern beaches. Winds had molded the sand into a series of steep, slippery terraces leading up to the first of the island's three airfields, but it was hoped that the assault waves would get up them fast and race across the airfield to the opposite side of the island, cutting the Japanese forces in two. Then one regiment would turn south and capture Mount Suribachi while the others, spread out in a single line across the whole island, would move north over the high, rocky ground of its widest part to seize the other two airfields. Later, to my consternation, I learned that the 21st Marines had been ordered to pull ahead of the rest of the reserve units of the 3rd Division and get to Iwo quickly, ready to land immediately, if necessary, in support of the 4th and 5th Divisions. It was an ironic situation for me, and I felt a sense of guilt. I had left my outfit so that I would have the flexibility to go in with the first of our units that might be ordered to land. Now I was stuck with the division command, which was *not* going to move ahead with the first unit—and the first unit was going to be my own.

As the rest of us continued to sail north at a slower pace, the weather gradually turned gray and colder. "It's like winter," one of our corporals complained. Of course, it *was* winter, but we had been in the tropics for so long that it was hard to realize that we were at last moving out of them. At night the holds below the water level were very cold, and we slept on the tiers of canvas bunks and huddled in dungarees and heavy combat jackets under our blankets and camouflaged ponchos. The ventilation pipes that ran through the holds gave us more trouble. In the tropics troops had punctured the pipes in hundreds of places so that the cool air would blow onto their steamy bunks. Now we tried to stuff every hole to prevent the air from freezing us.

On February 16, three days before D-day, we were still far south of Iwo and thinking of ourselves as the "floating reserve" that would never be needed. North of us that morning the preliminaries of the battle began. At 6:00 A.M. our powerful bombardment fleet of six battleships, five cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and a dozen aircraft carriers appeared off Suribachi. An hour later, coordinating with rocket, strafing, and bombing runs by carrier planes and B-24's from the Marianas, the fleet began a systematic attempt to knock out all known Japanese defense installations on the island. The day was a failure. An overcast came down, and all shelling and air attacks had to end with the known destruction of only seventeen of almost seven hundred identified pillboxes and other targets.

The next day was little better; only one more day of shelling remained before the landing, and the island's fortifications scarcely had been touched. It was decided that on the final day everything would have to be concentrated on the Japanese beach defenses, so that the Marines could at least get ashore. That objective was met. In a final thunderous shelling that pounded the eastern rim of the island on February 18, many Japanese installations, housing heavy guns overlooking the landing beaches, were rocked and smashed, from Suribachi in the south to the high ground in the north. Still, as

D-day, February 19, 1945: a wave of 4th Division Marines pours from the landing craft onto the beach.
U.S. MARINE CORPS

night fell, it was known that hundreds of other strongholds somehow would have to be eliminated after the Marines got ashore.

Even though we were still south of Iwo and out of sight of the island, we followed the progress of the landings the next morning, February 19, as if we were about to go ashore ourselves. On our transport were many signal company men with radios used to link together the different elements of the division. We gathered around the receivers, listening to the crackling transmissions coming from ships of the fleet, from air observers in small planes over the island, and from units of the 4th and 5th Divisions, which were preparing to make the beachhead.

The pattern of an amphibious landing had long since become familiar to us: usually the naval shelling and aerial bombing, strafing, and dropping of napalm would intimidate the Japanese beach defenders, and our first waves, carried ashore in the wells of armored LVT's (amphibious tractors), would hit the beach with relative ease and light casualties. Then our shelling and bombing would have to lift, the enemy would come alive and rush back to their guns, and our later waves would catch hell. At the same time, those who got onto the beach would start taking casualties from the front and flanks. But by then we would be moving steadily against the enemy, no matter how strong the resistance might be.

The voices coming through from Iwo conveyed that familiar pattern.

"Very light swells," a message crackled out. "Boating excellent."

At 0852: "Few enemy mortar shells landing in water. Our boats moving in."

Eight minutes later came the exciting word: "First wave ashore."

For an hour the news seemed incredibly good. As the storm and smoke of our naval gunfire lifted off the beaches, the Japanese began fighting back, but not with the intensity we expected. We heard of wave after wave coming ashore, of men clambering up the sliding-sand terraces and reaching a part of the first airfield. Japanese mortars and machine guns began to claim lives, but the Marines kept moving ahead, knocking out pillboxes with demolition charges or silencing their defenders with grenades and flame throwers.

By mid-morning all the assault battalions had landed, and the beaches were crowded with men and equipment. LSM's, ramming against the shore, were pouring Sherman tanks and vehicles onto the sand. Up ahead, infantry companies of the 4th and 5th Divisions pushed inland, trying to achieve their objective of getting across the narrow neck of the island to cut the Japanese forces in two. Casualties were increasing, but the situation still seemed surprisingly good. Then suddenly the concealed heavy weapons of the Japanese opened up. From hidden fortifications around Suribachi in the south, from the bunkers and ridges on the high northern part of the island, and from pillboxes protecting the first airfield, barrages of huge rockets and artillery and heavy mortar shells began crashing on the beaches and among the men trapped above them on the tableland.

We could tell something terrible was going on. Normally, in the past, the Japanese had fought furiously to defend their



beaches. But as we later learned, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, commanding the Japanese forces on Iwo, had decided to let our main attacking force crowd ashore, offering only minimal resistance while the Marines spread across the low saddle of the island. Once he felt he had the bulk of our troops exposed on that open flatland and on the beaches, caught between his concealed heavy weapons on Suribachi and the northern plateau, he would let us have it, hoping to stop all reinforcements and annihilate the men ashore or drive them off the island.

For a time it seemed that he might succeed. From the radio reports we knew we were taking huge casualties, and whole companies and platoons were losing their leaders. Somehow, in all the wild fighting during the rest of the day, units of the 28th Marines of the 5th Division got across the island and effectively isolated Mount Suribachi. Throughout the second day we continued to listen to our radios. In the morning progress seemed good. Most of the first airfield was in our hands, and the 28th Marines were moving closer to the base of Suribachi. On the right flank other regiments were straightening a line across the island and beginning to fight northward toward the second airfield.

"They won't need us," one of our men said. "This thing will be over in five days."

But as the day wore on, grimness returned. The advances had been stopped, and in some places our units seemed to have been pushed back. The announcement of our casualties shocked us. They ranged from 25 to 35 per cent among the assault battalions. Several thousand men, we were told, already had been taken off the island. Late in the afternoon word circulated that the battered units of the 4th and 5th Divisions needed reinforcements, and the 21st Marines had been ordered ashore. We understood that a crisis was developing, that the Japanese had stopped our entire northward push and were inflicting intolerable casualties on us. Few of us talked. We worried, wondering who among our friends had been killed or wounded.

Meanwhile we continued to cruise about, still out of sight of the island, waiting for orders. Finally they came. Division command was going in.

We sailed through the night and at dawn, five days after the battle had begun, were off Iwo. It was an ugly, gray island, looking, as one man said, like a half-submerged mummy case. A small American flag flew from the top of Suribachi, which had just been taken by the 28th Marines. We knew nothing yet of the story of the flag raising, but the sight of the flag was exciting, for it meant that our rear, at least, was now secure. The northern half of the island, much higher than the saddle area of the landing beaches, was shrouded in yellow and brown smoke, pocked every so often by bright red flashes.

Ships of every size and description swarmed about us. Close to shore the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers were still firing at targets north of the beach section. Green-painted LST's, LSM's, LCI's, and other amphibious landing vessels moved back and forth among big blue transports and Liberty ships, taking ammunition, supplies, and men to the beaches and backing out again with full loads of litter-borne wounded whom they carried to a white hospital ship. Around that vessel was a small fleet of brown ducks—long amphibious trucks—also full of wounded, who were being lifted by winch and lines to the hospital ship. Altogether more than eight hundred ships were engaged in the job of taking the island.

Our own holds were filled with mortar and artillery shells, which were badly needed ashore, and for a day we were kept aboard, filling cargo nets with the cloverleafs and crates of the precious ammunition. In the evening we had an air raid by *kamikaze* flyers. As soon as the planes were sighted, our ships put up smoke to screen us from the air. The unloading had to stop; we were suddenly in a thick fog, scarcely able to see one another. While we waited on deck close to the railings (on the debatable theory that if our ammunition got hit and blew up, we would be catapulted into the water, clear of the ship), we could hear the planes above us and then ack-ack and explosions. At one point something hissed close by. There was a crash, and metal pieces struck the side of our ship. Down below, we could see a red flame on the water. None of us knew whether it was a bomb fragment, part of a plane, or some of our own ack-ack, but one of our men suddenly was holding his leg. His trousers were shredded, and his knee was covered with blood. "Does this rate a Purple Heart?" he asked. He was the only person injured on our ship, although fragments splashed around us for another half hour.

The next morning we went over the side and into an LCM that was bobbing in the swells at the bottom of the cargo net. The Navy coxswain was unshaven and bleary-eyed; he had been taking men ashore since D-day.

"What are you?" he asked. "The garrison?"

We didn't answer.

On our way in, a mortar shell exploded in the water about twenty feet from us.

"I thought the battle was over," a sergeant said.

"It is," the coxswain retorted. "That's just some fanatic that won't give up."

With other craft from division headquarters, we passed from one line of control boats to another. As we neared the beach, we became part of a scene of vast confusion. We could see a great jumble on the sand—wrecked and burned-out boats, tanks, ducks, and other vehicles; mounds of equipment of all kinds, some split open and strewn about; piles of ammunition crates and communication wire; casualty evacuation stations; upended amtracs and jeeps; long lines of drums of water and gasoline; dugouts and foxholes, many partly covered with camouflaged ponchos and shelter halves; ration boxes; and artillery firing positions. At first there seemed to be no order, but placards and signs indicated the identities of the sections of the beach and the locations of aid stations, message and communication centers, and unit and beachmaster command posts and headquarters.

The organized clutter of war is amply documented by this view of the Iwo beachhead shortly after the landing.
U.S. MARINE CORPS

The steep slope leading up to the airfield was covered with the men and equipment of support outfits—Seabees, Army duck drivers, Navy boatmen, and others, their units so intermingled that it seemed impossible to sort them out. In their midst were some of our big guns, dug deeply in the sand with only their muzzles clearly visible. Every so often a Japanese mortar shell exploded, and people dove for the sand. A moment later litter bearers scrambled to where the black smoke still billowed.

The air was filled with the familiar sour smell of death and blood. Pale white bodies bobbed in the water, along with torn life jackets, and we could see other forms lying motionless on the beach near the water's edge. Just as we were about to land, we brushed past a body without a head.

My immediate aim was to find and rejoin the 21st—or what was left of it. After we landed, I climbed the slope past the foxholes of a unit of black Army duck drivers who had been on the island since D-day and moved northward along the edge of the first airfield, which Seabees were already blading and rolling. Battered Japanese planes had been bulldozed to the side of the field, and among them were signs that read, "Danger. Booby traps." Near the northern side of the field I saw another sign pointing ahead with an arrow: "The Front." Behind me, mortar shells started falling on the field, but the Seabees kept working.

A high bluff marked the northern end of the field, and there I found the command post of the 21st, with masses of men sitting and lying on the sand. I knew everyone, but they all looked unfamiliar—bearded, dirty, with matted hair, black, puffy lips, and eyes that were watery and distant. One man came over and took my hands but he stared through me and kept nodding. "We did it," he said. "We broke through." He was a member of one of the rifle companies, and I wondered what he was doing back at the regimental command post. Then I noticed bandages on his wrist and under a slashed pants leg. "They want to evacuate me," he said. "I got hit twice."

Jerry Gruggen, a jeep ambulance driver, came over. His eyes were bloodshot, and he was shaking with anger. "Come on, damn it," he said to the rifleman. "You want to go down to the beach or don't you?"

"I don't," the rifleman said.

Gruggen grabbed his arm and pulled him. "You don't know what the hell you're doing. Come on." He hustled him over to the ambulance, which already held two stretcher cases. As he shoved him in, Gruggen noticed me. "They took us out of the lines," he said. "It was about time. A little bit more, and there wouldn't have been any of us left."

I still didn't know what had happened, but I didn't want to ask anyone. At the top of the bluff, I found my own company dug in among a row of pillboxes. Everyone was dazed and grim, but they greeted me warmly, as if I were a messenger from the outside world. Some of them were living inside the pillboxes, and in one of them I found several close friends, including Dick Dashiell, a combat correspondent who had stayed with the 21st. He told me that Bill Middlebrooks, the correspondent who had taken my place with the unit, was dead. So were dozens of other men I had known. He listed the names like a roll call.

The pillbox was lined with bunks and had served as a Japanese sick bay. It had concrete and rock walls and roofing fourteen feet thick and was entirely covered by volcanic sand. To enter it, one squeezed through a small opening below the surface of the ground and pushed through a narrow tunnel. There was a lantern inside, and as we sat on the bunks, I caught up with what had happened. For two days after the 21st had gone into the lines, the 1st and 2nd Battalions had tried to seize the area between the first and second airfields. They had run into a deep belt of pillboxes, bunkers, and bombproofs like the one in which we were sitting and had been stopped both days with heavy casualties. Little ground had been won, tanks had been unable to open a path, and the men had been pinned down in the rocks and sand. Both battalions had lost almost 50 per cent of their men.

On the third day, the 3rd Battalion, which had been held in reserve, went into the lines with orders to get through the enemy defenses at all costs. Our entire cross-island line was being held up and taking heavy casualties. Behind supporting bombardment, I and K Companies led the new attack, creeping forward with fixed bayonets. As it had on the two previous days, Japanese machine-gun, mortar, and rifle fire picked up. Some men fell, but the rest kept going. Mortar shells dropped among them, the commanding officers of both companies were killed, and lieutenants and sergeants took over, rushing the squads and platoons forward, faster and faster.

It became a frenzied charge. Throwing grenades and refusing to let the intense Japanese fire pin them down, the men hurtled up and over the first line of pillboxes. Some of the Japanese came out, and the men killed them with their bayonets and went on, surging past mounds of bunkers and blockhouses and toward a slope leading to the second airfield.

In their rear, mortars hurled 60's and 81's ahead of the attacking men. Our tanks, long held up, began to move forward, blasting at the pillboxes. The Japanese replied with fire from their heavy guns hidden in positions north of the second airfield. Still, I and K Companies swept ahead, past more lines of pillboxes and through mine fields. In a burst they reached the second airfield and raced across an open runway to a high, rock-strewn ridge on the opposite side. K Company, now urged on by First Lieutenant Raoul Archambault, who had won medals for gallantry at Bougainville and Guam, was the first across and up the ridge. It was honeycombed with pillboxes connected by fire trenches, and the surprised Japanese swarmed out to fight, hand to hand. The struggle with bayonets, rifles, and grenades was bloody and brief. When it ended, the survivors of the two companies stood on top of the ridge eight hundred yards from where they had started. They had paid a shattering price in dead and wounded, but through the hole they had punched, tanks, flame throwers, demolition teams, mortars, and machine gunners now streamed, attacking the bypassed strongpoints and knocking them out, one by one.

By the time I had rejoined the 21st, the regiment had been relieved by the 9th Marines, who were now up ahead, battling beyond the second airfield. The different units of the 21st, their strength seriously depleted, were in "the rear," resting and trying to regroup, but I was soon to learn that there was no rear. I stayed that night in the pillbox with Dashiell and other friends, feeling strangely secure and out of the battle. Every so often we heard the dull whoomp of shells bursting nearby, but the thick walls and sand cover of the pillbox gave reassurance—as it had to its Japanese builders.

The next morning I set out to get some stories. Somewhere far behind me, near the beach, was division headquarters, where I would bring the articles for distribution to the civilian press. My radio-recording equipment also would be there, brought ashore in a jeep that I hoped I would soon be able to use in getting around to different outfits.

I headed for Able and Baker Companies of the 1st Battalion, whose stories I had not yet heard. On the way, I skirted revetments along the northern end of one of the strips of the first airfield, and at one of them came on the 1st Battalion's aid station. Mortar shells had just landed on top of the revetment, their fragments wounding a number of men. Just as I arrived, a commotion started on top of another part of the revetment. Two Marines were standing up there, etched against the sky. The Navy corpsmen and doctors were yelling at them to get the hell down, they were drawing fire. The men didn't move. Then several others appeared. One doctor angrily clawed his way up the wall to try to pull them down. He was too late. A huge blast, followed by another, sent up fountains of sand and smoke. When they settled, the doctor was at the bottom of the slope, and wounded men were hanging over the revetment.

Corpsmen grabbed first-aid pouches and struggled up the steep slope. At the top, one yelled, "There's a whole bunch of guys been hit up here. Bring up stretchers!" We dragged litters to the top. Helmets, shovels, and torn, charred equipment cluttered the area. Twelve men lay on the ground, bleeding into the sand. Three were already dead.

The corpsmen worked on the wounded, tying on combat dressings and giving plasma. Then the wounded, writhing with pain, were lowered into the revetment. "What were you doing up there?" asked a doctor. "We told you to get down."

"We were an artillery observation team," said one of the wounded men. "How can you see the Japs on this damn island if you don't stick your head up?"

As I was about to leave, a rumbling noise approached the revetment along the runway.

"Oh, no!" someone called.

A half-track with a 75-mm. gun was coming along the strip, trying to stay close to the shelter of the revetments. It was sure

"Whether the dead were Japs or Americans," correspondent Robert Sherrod wrote, "they had died with the greatest possible violence." The combined total for both would be more than twenty-five thousand.

WIDE WORLD

to draw fire. The next instant, however, there was an explosion *beneath* the half-track. The vehicle rose slowly and turned over, losing its tread. As we ducked, debris rained through the air. A doctor and two corpsmen raced to the smoking half-track and pulled five burned bodies from the wreckage. Only two of the crew were still alive. Again the corpsmen went to work with bandages and plasma.

"They must have hit something big," said the doctor. "Probably a torpedo warhead."

I finally left the aid station and headed for the rifle companies, crossing an open plain of large black sand dunes and torn banyan trees. This was part of the area taken by the 3rd Battalion during its charge, and the dunes covered rows of silent Japanese pillboxes. Dead Marines still lay in awkward positions where they had fallen during the charge, their faces purple and puffed, and their weapons full of sand. On a pile of rocks was the partly naked bottom half of a man. Halfway across the ghastly field, I heard the sharp sound of a Nambu machine gun. I had no idea where it was coming from, but I loped the rest of the way, zigzagging and keeping low.

The companies were dug into foxholes among the dunes and bushes across the field. Able Company had only one officer left—a captain. "We're in reserve," he said, "but we're still losing men. Be careful. There are machine guns and snipers all around here."

I stayed there the rest of the day, hearing of the 1st and 2nd Battalions' heavy losses in their attempts to break through to the second airfield. That night I joined an old friend, Sergeant Reid Chamberlain, in digging and sharing a two-man foxhole. Chamberlain was a Marine Corps hero. He had been with the 4th Marines on Bataan and Corregidor early in the war and had escaped in a small boat to Mindanao, where he had helped organize and lead Filipino guerrilla units on that Japanese-occupied island. He had received a U.S. Army commission and finally had been taken off Mindanao in a submarine. Back in the United States he had received the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism, and he could have stayed at home, making War Bond speeches for the rest of the war. Instead he had reenlisted, asking for overseas duty again, and had been sent to our division on Guam as a sergeant.

During the night, one of us would try to sleep for a couple of hours, while the other stared out of the foxhole into the darkness, keeping watch. Land crabs slithered over the sand, sounding like Japanese crawling toward us. Japanese signal flares and our own flares hung overhead, throwing eerie, moving shadows. The Japanese fired mortars, and our artillery answered, and we could hear the whir of the missiles passing over our heads. Every so often a shell landed near us. As I fell into fitful dreams, it sounded like someone slamming doors.

Before dawn we were awakened and told we were moving up to relieve the 9th Marines. The day before—after two earlier days of heavy fighting—the 9th had captured high ground north of the second airfield, but they were worn out. With the 3rd Battalion of the 21st, we were going to pass through the lines of the 9th and continue the attack early in the morning.

Soon afterward, as it became light, the 3rd Battalion passed us in a line, going toward the northern end of the second

airfield. Riflemen trudged quietly, their weapons on their shoulders with bayonets already fixed. Among them were BAR men, carrying big Browning automatic rifles, and flame-thrower squads hunched beneath their heavy cylindrical cannisters. Machine gunners carried the sections of their guns, and men with boxes of ammunition walked beside them. After them came the mortar men. Almost everyone was hung with grenades.

Soon we were on our way, climbing past rows of knocked-out pillboxes, crossing the southern end of the second airfield, and going into position to the left of the 3rd Battalion. The terrain had changed dramatically. We had left behind the volcanic sand dunes and now faced a wild stretch of rocky badlands, cut into a maze of ridges, ravines, and chasms, much of it chewed up by our bombing and naval gunfire. It typified the landscape of almost the entire northern part of Iwo.

The 9th Marines retired, and our attack got off behind a rolling barrage—the first of the campaign. For almost fifty minutes artillery and naval shells smashed into the ridges and gulleys ahead of us, then on signal lifted and crashed down on Japanese positions one hundred yards farther out. At the same time, our men rose from their holes and began to run forward, pausing to seek protection behind rocks and then sprinting ahead again. The thunderous gunfire had stunned the Japanese, and we advanced two hundred yards before they recovered. When their mortars and machine guns began firing, our attack stopped. Units sought cover and methodically broke into fire teams, moving one by one to eliminate the individual Japanese positions, which were now all around us.

The coordinated team attacks—the method by which the island was being won—required precision timing and extreme bravery. Heedless of danger, men with smoke bombs and phosphorous grenades clambered among the rocks to within throwing distance of a Japanese hole. As soon as the smoke and curtain of phosphorous obscured the enemy's vision, flame throwers and automatic riflemen and bazooka men rushed across the open into covering position. The smoke drifted away, and as the riflemen watched every hole for movement, a flame thrower, completely exposed, shot his burning liquid at the target hole, then turned and ran for cover. The riflemen finished the job with grenades, bazookas, automatic fire, and bayonets.

Sometimes it didn't work, and when flanking fire from other enemy positions killed or pinned down the teams, tanks were called up to fire point-blank. Flame-throwing tanks were also used. Again and again cave mouths and holes were simply sealed with demolition charges. Often positions had to be eliminated two, three, and four times. On this day of the rolling barrage, we gained considerable ground and knocked out scores of strong points in the ridges. But that night the enemy came back through their tunnels, and the next morning when the attack got going again, the ridges and caverns behind us were once more filled with Japanese who had to be eliminated by reserve units.

As our advance continued toward the northern edge of the island, no area in that rocky part of Iwo ever seemed secure. Ridge after ridge had to be cleaned out time and again by fire teams and tanks. Casualties were almost as heavy in the rear as at the front. One night a unit of the 9th Marines dug in on a knob supposedly freed of the enemy. The entire hill was blown up during the night by Japanese who were still inside; it was a suicide gesture that killed many Marines. On another day, we spent hours with flame throwers, tanks, and demolition men wiping out machine gunners and snipers hidden in a long, craggy ridge that had been "secured" twice before. When we thought we had again sealed the last hole, several of us, including Reid Chamberlain, started back toward the companies at the front. Three shots rang out from the ridge, and we ran for cover behind some boulders. When we looked back, Chamberlain was on the ground. We tried to edge back to him, but the whole ridge suddenly came alive again with Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire. Other Marines joined us, and one of them managed to reach Chamberlain's body. The former hero of Mindanao was dead, shot behind the ear.

I spent the night in the pillbox again, back at regimental headquarters. Joe Rosenthal, the Associated Press photographer, whom I had known on Guam, joined us. He was an unlikely looking figure in combat, short and nearsighted, with an oversized pot helmet that came down over his glasses. But everybody knew him as a brave little man who always showed up where the action was. He had heard from the States that he had taken the greatest picture of the war, but he had sent back hundreds of shots, and for a long time he had had no idea which picture was being talked about. That day, an airplane from Guam had dropped our first sacks of mail, and I got a letter from my mother. It expressed relief that I was not on Iwo Jima. But also enclosed was the front page of the New York *Sun*, with the now-famous flag-raising picture covering the entire page.

"That's the shot!" Joe told us all proudly.

After I got back to the States, I was shocked to hear some people calling the picture "staged" and a fake. Actually, two patrols of the 28th Marines had gotten to the top of Suribachi before the famous flag-raising. The second one had a small flag and raised it on a piece of pipe, while Sergeant Louis R. Lowery, a photographer for *Leatherneck* magazine, took pictures of it. A couple of hours later, the commanding officer of the 28th decided to keep that flag as a regimental souvenir. He got another, larger one from an LST and sent up a third patrol to change the flags. Accompanied by Sergeant William Genaust, a combat photographer with a color movie camera, Rosenthal followed this patrol up the mountain, and both men filmed the raising of the second flag. Rosenthal caught the

D-day plus forty-five, April 5, 1945: "We are going to fight bravely to the last," Japanese commander General Tadamichi Kuribayashi had declared. Most of the Japanese soldiers did.

US ARMY

scene at just the right instant, and his picture eclipsed the one that Lowery had taken two hours earlier.

The last weeks of fighting were a blur. Most of the northern part of the island was a wilderness of tall, jagged ridges, tumbled rocks, and deep gorges, all heavily fortified. Every yard of it had to be taken in combat as fierce as what we already had been through. Casualties continued to mount, and the ranks of survivors thinned in all three divisions. Replacements were pouring ashore and being killed or evacuated with wounds almost before they knew what outfit they were fighting with.

In the rear the first airfield became operational, and evacuation planes with Navy nurses landed, hastily picked up rows of stretcher cases, and took off again for the hospitals in the Marianas. One day a crippled B-29, on its way back from Japan, made a safe landing. Those around the airfield cheered. It was what the fighting was all about. Two days later our fighter planes began to arrive—P-51 Mustangs and P-61 Black Widows.

From time to time I picked up a jeep at division headquarters and went as far forward with it as I dared, making recordings to send back to the American networks. I followed the battalions of the 21st, and on occasion drew mortar and rifle fire. Once, in an area that steamed from sulphur deposits, I had to run from the jeep and was pinned down on the painfully hot sand for half an hour. Another time, something exploded near me, and Jerry Gruggen, the jeep ambulance driver, took me back to an aid station. They said I had a concussion, gave me two APC pills (standard for everything that didn't bleed), let me rest an hour, and then told me to get back to my outfit.

On March 9 a twenty-eight-man patrol of the 1st Battalion's Able Company reached the northern coast, splitting the Japanese. Only three of the original members of the company were left; the rest were replacements.

The Japanese made their last stand in deep, cave-filled gorges around Kuribayashi's underground headquarters near the northwest coast. After terrible fighting, the 5th Division finally overran the area, which they named Bloody Gorge, but no one ever found Kuribayashi's body.

The island was declared officially secured on March 16, after twenty-six days of fighting. By that time the second airfield was in use, and B-29's, in trouble, were coming down regularly. The island was still not secure. Ten days later several hundred Japanese emerged from underground and overran an Army field hospital and the camps of an Air Force unit, Seabees, and the 5th Division's Pioneers. For months afterward men would be killing each other on the island.

"This," said the commander of the Seabees, Captain Robert C. Johnson, "is the most expensive piece of real estate the United States has ever purchased. We paid 550 lives and 2,500 wounded for every square mile."

☆ *Among Alvin Josephy's many books are* The Long and the Short and the Tall *(1946),* The Patriot Chiefs *(1961), and* The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the Northwest *(1965). For many years he was director of the book division of American Heritage Publishing Company, and he was editor of* AMERICAN HERITAGE *magazine from 1976 to 1978.*



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"New Research Could Alter Aces List"

Dr. Frank J. Olynyk

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New Research Could Alter Aces List

by Dr. Frank J. Olynyk

The Spring 1981 issue of Fortitudine *carried an article by author Robert Sherrod which updated a list of World War II Marine aces which originally appeared in his book,* History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. *Many of the changes on Sherrod's revised list originated from research by Dr. Frank J. Olynyk. The following article covers Dr. Olynyk's continued research. Readers should remember that the Marine Corps has not compiled an "official" list of its fighter aces. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Robert H. Barrow, recently wrote, "The philosophy of the Marine Corps Historical Program is that our history is not a closed book, but a living, continuing thing, open to new facts, interpretations, and opinions."*

During the course of World War II, the Marine Corps published several lists of its aces, pilots who had shot down five or more Japanese aircraft in air-to-air combat. These lists were prepared from cards maintained at Headquarters, Marine Corps by Lt (later Maj) Edna Loftus Smith. These cards, now kept in the Reference Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, have come to be known as the "Sherrod cards," since their main use has been as a research source for Robert Sherrod's *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II.* During the war, as war diaries and action reports came in from the Pacific, a brief page was prepared for each combat, and the information on aircraft victory claims transferred to the cards. As the war went on, other sources were used—award citations, personnel reports, and letters—and the monthly totals of victories for each pilot were included with the war diaries. These sources were used to produce the list appearing in the January 1946 issue of *Headquarters Bulletin* and, after revision, in Mr. Sherrod's book.

About five years ago, I visited the Reference Section and prepared a list of victory credits from the "Sherrod cards." I then keypunched the data and wrote computer programs to sort and list it by date, name, and unit. On succeeding visits, I have reviewed the sources for each victory credit, making sure that each could be documented. This has led to my own list of USMC victory credits, and a resulting list of USMC aces. I hope to publish the list of credits commercially in the near future.

In discussing aces and fighter pilots, a distinction must be made among claims, credits, and what actually happened. A credit is an acknowledgment by an official agency that it accepts a claim as valid. Whether in fact the pilot did shoot down the aircraft can usually only be determined by access to the enemy records. Gun camera films can be very convincing, but they must be used carefully to handle properly shared claims. Ideally, from the historian's point of view, one should not say a pilot shot down a plane without finding a corresponding loss in the enemy records.

It should be noted that most of the pilots whose scores are subject to some uncertainty are all from the 1942-early 1943 period when air combat was the heaviest. War diaries from this period are often incomplete, or even nonexistent (VMF-212, VMF-122, and VMO-251). Once Guadalcanal was captured, diaries and reports improved and when, in late 1943, a standard form, ACA-1, was introduced, documentation became excellent.

The Spring 1981 issue of *Fortitudine* carried Robert Sherrod's article, "Fighter Aces List Updated." I would like to correct some additional errors in this list of USMC aces and give the reasons behind the additional changes I would make in the list.

The first error occurred in preparing the new list for publication. The original list showed Philip C. DeLong with 11 1/6 victories during World War II, which is correct. In preparing the new list, *Fortitudine* accidentally changed the score to 11 1/2. He had an additional two victory credits in Korea, raising his ultimate score to 13 1/6.

A second printing error concerns Julius W. Ireland. When he was added to the list, it should have been with 5 1/3 victories, not the five shown in *Fortitudine*.

Dr. Olynyk received a bachelor of science in mathematics and master of science and doctor of philosophy degrees in computer science from Case Institute of Technology. He is employed by Ecotran Corporation, designing software for phototypesetting. In addition to building lists of victory credits, he is working on a daily history of fighter operations in the Pacific.

Two errors in totals have persisted through both lists. Hugh McJ. Elwood actually has 5 1/6 victory credits and Francis A. Terrill has 6 1/12. The unusual score for Terrill is the result of credits for 1/2, 1/3, and 1/4 victories (claims shared among two, three, and four pilots, respectively).

One final error which has persisted in both of Sherrod's lists is in the name of the 65th entry on Sherrod's revised list. His name should be Arthur Roger Conant, not Roger W. Conant. Both served in VMF-214, A. R. Conant during the period when Gregory Boyington was in command, while R. W. Conant was killed on the USS *Franklin* in 1945 when it was put out of action by Kamikazes.

There are two pilots whose scores need to be lowered, knocking them off the list. Capt Raymond F. Scherer served with VMF-311 in 1945. On 3 May he shared a "Frank" (Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate) with 2dLt Charles L. Kline, described in VMF-311's ACA-1 report number 132. The description of the combat on the last page of the report makes it clear that the victory should be shared. However, on the front page of the report, which lists the claims described by the report, Scherer's name appears alone. It was this error which was copied when Scherer's list of victories was prepared at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The VMF-311 war diary for May 1945 gives him a total of 4 1/2 victories. This is repeated in the June 1945 war diary, after which he left VMF-311.

Wayne W. Laird served with VMF-112 at Guadalcanal in 1942-43. The VMF-112 war diary credits him with two Zeros on 13 November 1942. VMF-121 was in the same combat and its war diary shows him with 1 1/2 victories and Donald C. Owen with 1 1/2. The VMF-121 war diary does not indicate with whom the victories were shared, but they were the only shared victories for that date. It should be noted that Owen has been added to Sherrod's new aces list. If Laird is credited with two victories on 13 November, then Owen does not belong on the list. Conversely, if the three victories in question are shared with 1 1/2 each, then Laird does not belong on the list. The matter was settled by reference to the VMF-112 tour totals for the 1942-43 period, when Laird is shown with only 4 1/2 victories. The VMF-121 tour total shows 2 1/2 for Owen. Laird disappeared on a test hop on 1 May 1943. Owen added 2 1/2 more victories with VMF-112 off the USS *Bennington* before spinning-in on take-off on 26 May 1945.

A few pilots should have their scores revised upwards. The most notable is William N. Snider, increased from 8 1/2 to 11 1/2 as described in Sherrod's article.

Edward O. Shaw's score should become 14 1/2, up from 13. One of these victories was confirmed about two months afterward when another pilot, shot down in the same combat, was rescued and added further details. The 1/2 credit just got lost when a summary total was prepared for the VMF-213 war diary. Since the "Zeke" in question was shared with Wilbur J. Thomas, and the 1/2 credit appears in Thomas' list, there can be no doubt of its authenticity. Shaw was killed in a flying accident on 31 July 1944, a month before his Naval Aviator's Monthly Achievement Report was prepared by someone else, showing 13 victories.

Howard J. Finn should be credited with one extra victory. This victory is shown on the back of his "Sherrod card," but not the front.

The scores for some pilots should be lowered. One of these is Donald H. Sapp, who appears on the Sherrod list with 11 victories. This should be 10. One of his victories was a "Helen" on 20 November 1943. Because ACA reports at the time were supposed to be filled out in Greenwich or "GCT" time, this claim appeared in the ACA report on 19 November and in the war diary, prepared in local time, on 20 November. Thus, the Helen was counted twice. Some additional confusion as occurred since the war because he changed his name to Stapp.

A strong case can be made for changing the score of Jack E. Conger to 10, down from 10 1/2. I have been able to find only 10 victories for him. I believe the confusion arose from a reference to his being credited with shooting down "ten and a half destroyer [10 planes and 1/2 a destroyer]."

Finally, there is a group of pilots for whom the published total score is greater than the number of victories I have been able to document. I emphasize that this does not mean that they should not be credited with the higher score; only that I have not been able to document the higher score. There is a strong presumption in several cases that the lower score is correct, but that is only a presumption.

John F. Dobbin appears on the list with eight victories; I have found only 7 1/2. He appears on a VMF-224 list with 8 1/2 victories, although there is no list of individual victories. Interestingly enough, his flight log shows only 6 1/2 victories. I suspect the jump from 7 1/2 to eight occurred by taking seven and one shared, and making it eight.

Similarly, Roger A. Haberman appears with seven; I can find only 6 1/2. The same conversion of a shared victory to a full victory may have occurred here. He served in VMF-121 as part of Joe Foss' flight. The oft-quoted figure of 72 victories for Foss' flight is derived from the following totals: Foss, 26; Marontate, 13 (one of which was a "smoker"); Loesch, 8 1/2; Haberman, 6 1/2; Freeman, 6; Presley, 5; Bate, 4; and Furlow (Thomas W.), 3. These are given in Joe Foss' wartime biography, *Joe Foss, Flying Marine*. Note the number of aces in this group (Bate was to make his fifth claim in the Philippines in 1944).

From the members of Foss' flight, there are two more pilots to discuss. In Robert Sherrod's article in *Fortitudine*, he decided to change Freeman's score because of the lack of conclusive evidence of the sixth victory. At the time I had found five victories, and had evidence for a sixth and seventh. Foss' book credited Freeman with two dive bombers on 5 January 1943. That was where matters stood when Sherrod was finished with his revisions to the new edition of his book. One month later, at the American Fighter Aces Association meeting in Dayton, Ohio, I met Bill Freeman, and we discussed his service with VMF-121. Bill said he only claimed one dive bomber on 5 January 1943. This would be his sixth victory.

Presley appears in Foss' book with five victories, and on the Sherrod list with six. Presley's Navy Cross citation states that he shot down three on the first tour of VMF-121 (9 October-23 November 1942) and two on the second tour (1-30 January 1943). The citation describes a specific occasion on which he shot down a dive bomber. I believe this undated victory became his sixth. I have found no reference crediting him with more than five victories. It is possible that his four and one shared became five in his citation. Perhaps if the original recommendation for his Navy Cross could be found it might clear this up.

Other pilots at Guadalcanal in 1942 do not have all their credited victories in the relevant war diaries. Orvin Ramlo is credited with five but none are in the MAG-23 or VMF-223 war diaries. He received credit for five (two "Betty" bombers and three "Zeros") on the basis of his Naval Aviator's Monthly Report, prepared in 1944. When these report forms came into use in 1944, the first submissions by veteran pilots recapitulated their victories since the beginning of the war. I did find a 1945 war diary (VMF-113 for July 1945) which notes that he had just received credit for three aircraft shot down in August 1942. I have found no award citations for the relevant period.

Joseph Narr is credited with eight at Guadalcanal, but his "Sherrod card" lists one victory on 2 October 1942. However, he is not credited with any victories on that date in either the MAG-23 or the VMF-121 war diaries. I did locate a newspaper article which quoted from his letters to his father. He described only seven victories in these letters.

Harold Bauer is credited with 11, but I have found only 10. He is frequently mentioned as shooting down four "Zeros," and getting one "smoker" in one combat. However, it is also mentioned that he refused to claim the smoker as shot down. That may be his eleventh victory. It should be mentioned that other pilots are credited with "smokers" as having been shot down.

Eugene Trowbridge is credited with 12, but I can find only six, the same number mentioned in his Navy Cross citation. The number 12 arises from his Naval Aviator's Monthly Achievement Report (NAMAR), prepared in 1944. I should point out that I have not seen the NAMAR of either Trowbridge or Ramlo, only the information on their "Sherrod cards." Trowbridge's case is a little unusual, however, since if the information is correct, he was the first Marine Corps ace in World War II, getting five victories between 21-24 August 1942. Marion Carl, who has been accepted as the first Marine ace, got victories numbers five and six on 26 August 1942. Another problem is that one documented claim by Trowbridge is not on his "Sherrod card." Finally, a press release from the Division of Public Relations dated 7 December 1942, credits him with 10 victories.

Loren Everton is credited with 12 also. Two of these were in 1944 in the Northern Solomons campaign, the others at Guadalcanal. He usually appears in contemporary reports with eight victories; one source (newspaper clipping), says eight plus two bombers on fire. His "Sherrod card" lists eight, seven of which are in the war diaries. The card documents number eight by reference to the manuscript of *Marine Wings*, which I have not been able to find.

Marion Carl is another Guadalcanal pilot with whose victory list I have problems. He is credited with 18 1/2 victories during the war. Of these, one was at Midway and two were at Rabaul in 1943. The remainder were from the 1942 Guadalcanal campaign. Thus, by the time he left Guadalcanal, he should have had 16 1/2 victories. I have found 15, and many contemporary references say he had 16

when he left. One victory is listed in the war diaries as an "assist" of Noyes McLennan by Carl. McLennan is correspondingly credited with assisting Carl. The term "assist" was used in some 1942 records to indicate that a pilot helped another to shoot down a plane, but did not give sufficient help to receive partial credit for the victory. Thus both pilots "assisted" in the victory, and I have given them each 1/2 credit. According to Barrett Tillman, who lives near Carl, the latter claims full credit for this victory. Carl also claims credit for a "Betty" on 24 August 1942, which would be his fifth victory. However, as far as I can ascertain from Japanese records, the aircraft attacked by Marines that day were "Zeros" and single-engine bombers from the carrier *Ryujo*. Carl has credit for two single-engine bombers and one "Zero" on that date. As mentioned earlier, his victories on 26 August are frequently said to be his victories numbers 5 and 6. The missing victory, whether it was on 24 August or later, was apparently confirmed while Carl was still at Guadalcanal. The extra 1/2 credit for the victory with McLennan would have to have been confirmed later, since he left Guadalcanal with 16 victories and returned to the Solomons in 1943 with 16 1/2.

Two pilots at Guadalcanal may have one more victory than they are credited with on the Sherrod list. Robert Galer (13) and Kenneth Frazier (12 1/2) may each have one more, but this could just reflect the confusion of the times. Most of their victories appear in both the MAG-23 and their respective squadron war diaries. A few appear in only one or the other.

After the furious action at Guadalcanal in 1942-43, the records were generally kept with much greater care, there being more time and energy available for such non-immediate tasks. However, James Cupp is credited with 13 victories, but I can find only 12. Nevertheless, his "Sherrod card" states: "Actually a 13-plane ace but squadron records only account for 12."

Robert M. Baker is listed with seven victories, but I can find only five plus a "probable." Some sources say he shot down six planes, and his "Sherrod card" gives him two victories on the date of the "probable." It references the war diary, but I cannot find it there. Baker himself says he believes that the two victories were confirmed later.

Finally, Jack Pittman is listed with seven victories, but I can find only five, plus two "probables" for 1943. The VMF-224 war diary for August 1945 says seven victories, which was accepted as his final total.

During World War II, several Marine pilots served temporarily with Navy units, but none were aces. However, there was an Army pilot who flew with the Marines at least once and he was an ace. Paul S. Bechtal, of the USAAF, had four victories with an Army fighter squadron in 1942-43. On 2 September 1943, he flew a mission with VMF-124 to Kahili, and shot down a "Zeke." This was carried on the VMF-124 records as one of the unit's claims, credited to Bechtal. However, since he was flying with the Marines at the time, the victory has not been recognized by the Air Force, and he is not listed as one of their aces.

Any definitive discussion of Marine aces should consider victories from the Korean War which do not appear on Sherrod's revised list of World War II aces. John Andre claimed four victories in the Philippines in 1944; his fifth victory was in Korea in 1952. Several aces on Sherrod's list gained additional victories in Korea. Philip DeLong shot down two YAKs while flying with VMF-312. Bolt, Wade, and Durnford claimed six, one, and 1/2 MIG-15s, respectively, while flying on exchange duty with the Air Force.

Aces List Compared

(Totals in parentheses include Korean War victories.)

	Sherrod's Revised List	Olynyk's List
1. Boyington, Gregory	28*	28*
2. Foss, Joseph J.	26	26
3. Hanson, Robert M.	25	25
4. Walsh, Kenneth A.	21	21
5. Aldrich, Donald N.	20	20
6. Smith, John L.	19	19
7. Carl Marion E.	18 1/2	18 1/2
8. Thomas, Wilbur J.	18 1/2	18 1/2
9. Swett, James E.	15 1/2	15 1/2
10. Spears, Harold L.	15	15
11. Donahue, Archie G.	14	14
12. Cupp, James N.	13	13**
13. Galer, Robert E.	13	13**
14. Marontate, William P.	13	13
15. Shaw, Edward O.	13	14 1/2
16. Frazier, Kenneth D.	12 1/2	12 1/2**
17. Everton, Loren D.	12	10

(continued on next page)

18. Segal, Harold E.	12	12
19. Trowbridge, E.A.	12	12**
20. DeLong, Philip C.	11 1/2	11 1/6 (13 1/6)
21. Snider, William N.	11 1/2	11 1/2
22. Bauer, Harold W.	11	11
23. Sapp, Donald H.***	11	10
24. Conger, Jack E.	10 1/2	10
25. Long, Herbert H.	10	10
26. DeBlanc, Jefferson J.	9	9
27. Magee, Christopher L.	9	9
28. Mann, Thomas H., Jr.	9	9
29. Overend, Edmund F.	9*	9*
30. Thomas, F. C., Jr.	9	9
31. Loesch, Gregory K.	8 1/2	8 1/2
32. Morgan, John L., Jr.	8 1/2	8 1/2
33. Case, William N.	8	8
34. Dobbin, John F.	8	7 1/2
35. Gutt, Fred E.	8	8
36. Hernan, Edwin J., Jr.	8	8
37. Hollowell, George L.	8	8
38. Kunz, Charles M.	8	8
39. Narr, Joseph L.	8	7
40. Post, Nathan T.	8	8
41. Warner, Arthur T.	8	8
42. Yost, Donald K.	8	8
43. Baker, Robert M.	7	7**
44. Brown, William P.	7	7
45. Caswell, Dean	7	7
46. Crowe, William E.	7	7
47. Haberman, Roger A.	7	6 1/2
48. Hamilton, Henry B.	7	7
49. Jensen, Alvin J.	7	7
50. McClurg, Robert W.	7	7
51. O'Keefe, Jeremiah J.	7	7
52. Owens, Robert G., Jr.	7	7
53. Pittman, Jack, Jr.	7	7**
54. Reinburg, Joseph H.	7	7
55. Ruhsam, John W.	7	7
56. Wade, Robert	7	7 (8)
57. Williams, G. M. H.	7	7
58. Mullen, Paul A.	6 1/2	6 1/2
59. Durnford, Dewey F.	6 1/3	6 1/3 (6 5/6)
60. Dillard, Joseph V.	6 1/3	6 1/3
61. Axtell, George C., Jr.	6	6
62. Baird, Robert	6	6
63. Bolt, John F. Jr.	6	6 (12)
64. Chandler, Creighton	6	6
65. Conant, Roger W.****	6	
Conant, Arthur R.		6
66. Dillow, Eugene	6	6
67. Dorroh, Jefferson D.	6	6
68. Drury, Frank C.	6	6
69. Fisher, Don H.	6	6
70. Fraser, Robert B.	6	6
71. Hall, Sheldon O.	6	6
72. Hundley, John C.	6	6
73. Jones, Charles D.	6	6
74. McManus, John	6	6
75. Percy, Gilbert	6	6
76. Pierce, Francis E., Jr.	6	6
77. Pond, Zenneth A.	6	6
78. Presley, Frank H.	6	5
79. Shuman, Perry L.	6	6
80. Stout, Robert F.	6	6
81. Terrill, Francis A.	6	6 1/12
82. Valentine, Herbert J.	6	6
83. Vedder, Milton N.	6	6
84. Hansen, Herman	5 1/2	5 1/2
85. Hood, William L.	5 1/2	5 1/2
86. Kirkpatrick, Floyd C.	5 1/2	5 1/2
87. Lynch, Joseph P.	5 1/2	5 1/2
88. Maas, John B.	5 1/2	5 1/2
89. Payne, Frederick R., Jr.	5 1/2	5 1/2
90. Sigler, Wallace E.	5 1/3	5 1/3
91. Alley, Stuart C., Jr.	5	5
92. Balch, Donald L.	5	5
93. Baldwin, Frank B.	5	5
94. Bate, Oscar M.	5	5
95. Braun, Richard L.	5	5
96. Carlton, William A.	5	5
97. Davis, Leonard K.	5	5
98. Doyle, Cecil J.	5	5
99. Drake, Charles W.	5	5
100. Elwood, Hugh McJ.	5	5 1/6
101. Farrell, William	5	5
102. Finn, Howard J.	5	6
103. Fontana, Paul J.	5	5
104. Ford, Kenneth M.	5	5
105. Freeman, William B.	5	5
106. Hacking, Albert C.	5	5
107. Ireland, Julius W.	5	5 1/3
108. Kendrick, Charles	5	5
109. Laird, Wayne W.	5	4 1/2
110. McCartney, H.A., Jr.	5	5
111. McGinty, Selva E.	5	5
112. Olander, Edwin L.	5	5
113. Owen, Donald C.	5	5
114. Phillips, Hyde	5	5
115. Porter, Robert B.	5	5
116. Foske, George H.	5	5
117. Powell, Ernest A.	5	5
118. Ramlo, Orvin H.	5	5**
119. Scarborough, H.V., Jr.	5	5
120. Scherer, Raymond	5	4 1/2
121. See, Robert B.	5	5
122. Synar, Stanley	5	5
123. Weissenberger, G.J.	5	5
124. Wells, Albert P.	5	5
125. Yunck, Michael R.	5	5
126. Andre, John		4 (5)

*Both Boyington and Overend are credited with six planes while with Flying Tigers in China.

**Indicates unresolved problems with documentation.

***Since World War II, Sapp changed his name to Stapp.

****Dr. Olynyk found that the wrong Conant was included on Sherrod's list.

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The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points this device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.